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Abstract
Executives frequently forecast large operating e¢ ciency gains from mergers. Using
these projections, we study the impact of operating synergies on merger performance.
Investorsreaction to mergers varies directly with the availability of these forecasts and
the gains they imply, and post-merger operating performance increases with the pre-
dictable component of forecasted synergies based on deal characteristics. The realized
improvements, however, do not depend on the availability of forecasts or the surprise
they convey, and post-merger stock returns reconcile discrepancies between investors
ex ante beliefs and mergers ex post performance related to management forecasts.
Overall, the evidence supports the neoclassical view that synergiesexpectations and
realizations are important determinants of merger activity and performance.
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Abstract
Executives frequently forecast large operating e¢ ciency gains from mergers. Using
these projections, we study the impact of operating synergies on merger performance.
Investorsreaction to mergers varies directly with the availability of these forecasts and
the gains they imply, and post-merger operating performance increases with the pre-
dictable component of forecasted synergies based on deal characteristics. The realized
improvements, however, do not depend on the availability of forecasts or the surprise
they convey, and post-merger stock returns reconcile discrepancies between investors
ex ante beliefs and mergers ex post performance related to management forecasts.
Overall, the evidence supports the neoclassical view that synergiesexpectations and
realizations are important determinants of merger activity and performance.
1. Introduction
Neoclassical theories maintain that the ability of a merged entity to operate more ef-
ciently than the merging stand-alone rms, i.e., availability of synergies, is an important
determinant of merger activity and performance.1 Existing empirical studies commonly infer
the existence of synergies from various measures of merger performance. Short-term return
event studies indicate that net gains to merging rmsshareholders are positive, while analy-
ses of post-merger operating and stock performance provide mixed evidence, at best. In fact,
several researchers highlight that it may be di¢ cult or even unfeasible to draw inference
about the existence and magnitude of merger synergies from the avaiable evidence (e.g., Ka-
plan, Mitchell, and Wruck, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell, and Sta¤ord, 2001; Hietala, Kaplan, and
Robinson, 2003). In this study, we collect and analyze operating e¢ ciency gains forecasted
by merging rmsinsiders to test whether the potential and actual success of M&A depends
on the existence and magnitude of synergies.
In principle, managerial projections provide a unique experimental tool with which to
assess the economic relevance of merger-related e¢ ciencies, because insiders are in a unique
position to evaluate them. Yet, that insiders would portray M&A as having the potential to
generate large gains does not in and of itself constitute evidence that synergies exist. Indeed,
behavioral and agency theories imply that management projections, either knowingly or not,
may not provide a meaningful representation of merger-related gains.2 ;3 Therefore, whether
1See, for instance, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Kaplan (2000), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001),
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001).
2Insidersself-interested behavior is the driver of the merger decision in Jensen (1986), Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1990), and Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2005); bidder managers overcondence characterizes
Rolls (1986) hubris hypothesis; and market misvaluations drive mergers in Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004).
3Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) note that "it is often treacherous to take managements word for
iton a given matter" - p. 285. Along the same lines, a Wall Street Journal article characterizes managements
attitude around mergers as follows: "In a business world populated by spinmeisters, colorless conference calls,
and business-school jargon, there is still a special place for M&A rhetoric: it is universally optimistic, and
dressed in a dreamy gauze of post-deal cooperation. Its practitioners are by custom prevented from admitting
the slightest weakness."
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insidersforecasts in fact reect the existence and magnitude of real synergies is ultimately
an empirical question, which we analyze as part of our two-pronged empirical strategy.
First, we examine how market participantsex ante beliefs and merging rmsex post
operating performance relate to the availability of operating synergies projections and their
implied gains. Here, based on observable merger-specic factors, we decompose available
synergies forecasts into their expected and unexpected components, and predict the syn-
ergies that may be expected when insidersprojections are not available. We then analyze
the relation between merger performance and the predictableand surprisecomponents of
synergies forecasts. Second, to further gauge the economic relevance of operating e¢ ciency
gains in mergers, we test whether post-completion stock returns reconcile discrepancies be-
tween ex ante expectations and ex post realizations of those gains. Specically, we analyze
the relation between post-merger returns and the availability of synergies forecasts, as well
as investorsex ante capitalization of and rmsex post ability to deliver the gains projected
by management.
To conduct our analysis, we collected news stories and press-relases for 3,935 M&A deals
between rms listed on U.S. exchanges that were announced between 1990 and 2005. When-
ever available, we retrieve management forecasts of synergies: 23% percent of the deals are
accompanied by insidersforecasts, and their availability varies systematically with factors
expected to proxy for the existence of synergies, as well as the benet of communicating
them to market participants.4 The projected e¢ ciency gains are economically signicant, on
average, varying between $200 (3.4%) and $830 (14%) million (of the combined pre-merger
equity market cap) depending on the valuation model. And, controlling for self-selection,
rm and deal characteristics typically used as proxies of merger motives explain over 40% of
the variation in the projected operating gains.
Supporting the notion that synergies are an important determinant of capital markets
assessment of mergers, announcement returns are higher when insiders provide synergies fore-
casts and the implied e¢ ciency gains are larger. Interestingly, the relation between investors
reaction to merger o¤ers and the predictable component of synergies forecasts is similar
4In the Section 5, we present and discuss the tests that control for the potential e¤ect of self-selection bias
on our main results.
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across deals with and without management projections. However, merger annoucement re-
turns are also directly, signicantly related to the surpriseconveyed by the forecasts, when
insiders disclose them.
The post-merger operating performance analysis conrms that the success of mergers
varies directly with their potential for operating gains, although there are some important
distinctions compared to the market expectations analysis. Like for investorexpectations,
post-merger changes in operating performance increase with the predictable component of
merger-related gains forecasted by management, whether an actual forecast is available or
not. In contrast with the ex ante analysis, however, post-merger operating performance does
not vary signicantly with actual forecastsavailability or the surprise those convey. This
evidence is consistent with the notion that insiders forecasts of merger synergies may be
overly optimistic, whether knowingly or not, and that investorsex ante assessment is biased
upward when synergies forecasts that convey large positive surprises are disclosed.
In e¢ cient capital markets, if investors view the realization of synergies as a determi-
nant factor of post-merger valuations, stock returns should reconcile dicrepancies between
investorsex ante beliefs and actual post-merger operating performance relative to manage-
ment forecasts of synergies. Our tests support this conjecture, which may partly explain the
post-merger performance puzzle (Agrawal and Ja¤e, 2000). In particular, calendar-time
long portfolios of completed mergers accompanied by synergies forecasts earn negative ab-
normal returns, while long portfolios of deals without forecasts earn zero or positive returns.
The risk-adjusted return di¤erentials between the two portfolios become progressively more
signicant as investors have an opportunity to learn about the realized gains, ranging be-
tween over 3% and 12% on an annualized basis depending on the portfolio formation criteria
and expected return model. Finally, our last set of tests show that investorsex ante assess-
ment of the projected gains and rmsability to deliver them have opposite e¤ects of similar
magnitude, negative and positive respectively, on post-merger stock returns. Therefore, both
expectations and realizations of operating synergies are economically important determinants
of merger success.
Our study is most closely related to the analysis by Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001)
(HJR, henceforth) of synergies forecasts in 41 large bank mergers. Our research design, how-
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ever, di¤ers in several important ways. First, our analysis relies on a substantially larger and
more diverse sample of M&A, spanning a period during which synergies projections became
increasingly common and regulatory reforms may have a¤ected their quality. Second, by
decomposing projected synergy gains into expected and residual components, we investigate
how merger performance is related to synergy surprises. Third, to the extent possible, we
analyze the e¤ect of synergies on the performance of all mergers. Specically, we assess
how merger performance varies with the availability of synergies forecasts, as well as how it
relates to predictable synergieswhen no projection is available. Finally, we analyze whether
the post-merger stock returns reconcile potential discrepancies between investors ex ante
assessment and rms ex post operating performance with respect to the availability and
magnitude of synergies projections.
The remainder of the paper is divided in ve sections. In Section 2, we briey review
the related literature and establish the framework of our analysis. In Section 3, we present
our data, and discuss the relation between the gains projected by management and merging
rms characteristics typically associated with the existence of synergies. Section 4 presents
our main empirical tests and results, while Section 5 summarizes the robustness tests where
we control for the potential e¤ect of self-selection bias on our analysis. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2. Related literature and empirical framework
Academic studies rely on various measures of ex ante and/or ex post merger perfor-
mance to draw inferences about synergies. Starting with Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988),
countless researchers have assessed synergies using the combined announcement returns to
merging rmsshareholders based on event study methods.5 The combined return estimates
are typically positive, suggesting that M&A announcements convey net positive information.
Nonetheless, returns around merger announcements reect both new ancillary information
about the merging rmsstand-alone values as well as the value of expected synergies. There-
fore, relying on short-term event studies to infer the existence and magnitude of synergies is
5See recent and extensive reviews provided in Kaplan (2000) and Bruner (2004, 2005).
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theoretically unfeasible in most cases (Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson, 2003).
More recently, researchers have used changes in analystsforecasts to assess the potential
e¤ect of M&A on e¢ ciency (Harford, 2005; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Devos, Kada-
pakkam, and Krishnamurthy, 2009). Using Value Line estimates, Devos et al. nd that
changes in combined forecasts for 264 completed deals imply positive synergies, over 80%
of which are due to operating e¢ ciencies. However, there are some drawbacks to this ap-
proach. First, it requires analyst coverage, potentially biasing the analysis towards larger
and possibly more successful companies (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005).
Moreover, if merger events indeed reveal information about the stand-alone entities, changes
in analystsforecasts may su¤er from the same issues highlighted by Hietala et al. (2003) for
the announcement returns.
Another common approach is to assess the ex post performance of mergers using accounting-
based measures of operating performance or the merged entitys risk-adjusted long-term stock
performance. The inference drawn from post-merger changes in operating performance tends
to depend on the sample period and the method used to measure performance, casting doubts
on the systematic existence of synergies.6 Moreover, clinical studies suggest that the noise in
accounting measures may dwarf merger-related e¤ects (e.g., Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck,
2000).7 Finally, as Harford (2005) notes, there is a benchmark problembecause expectations
of how stand-alone rms may have fared absent the deal are hard to measure.
The evidence based on long-term stock returns is least supportive of the idea that syn-
ergies exist, with some suggesting the typically post-merger negative drift in stock prices
systematically outweighs the combined announcement gains (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau
and Vermaelen, 1998; Agrawal and Ja¤e, 2000). The evidence, however, is mixed with re-
6Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) nd that the raw protability of acquired business lines decreases following
mergers in the 1960-70s, while Lichtenberg (1992) documents plant-level productivity improvements in the
1970s and Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) report improved industry-adjusted asset productivity for the
50 largest deals in the 1980s. For more recent samples, 1981-1995 and 1985-1997 respectively, Ghosh (2001)
and Lie and Heron (2002) report contrasting results as well.
7Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2008) circumvent this issue by using plant-level data and nd that
acquirersrestructuring activity is consistent with mergers fostering allocation of resources to higher-valued
users.
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spect to the magnitude of the drift and largely dependent on the method used to measure
abnormal returns. Using the calendar-time portfolio approach advocated by Fama (1998),
Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2000) report negative estimates of smaller magnitude compared to
earlier studies.8 Based on the available evidence, it is not obvious what the empirical rela-
tion between post-merger long-term returns and synergiesexpectations and realizations may
be.
2.1. Insidersview on merger synergies
HJR (2001) are the rst to analyze synergies forecasts by merging rmsinsiders. Al-
though limited to a sample of 41 large deals in the banking sector, their study provides
valuable insights. First, the gains implied by insidersforecasts are typically large, approxi-
mately 13% of the merging bankscombined equity. Moreover, equity returns capitalize large
fractions of the projected cost e¢ ciencies, but virtually none of the revenue enhancements.
Finally, a qualitative assessment of analystsopinions and merged entitiesnancial reports
suggests that some of the cost synergies are in fact available. Although HJR caution against
drawing inferences about optimism in managersforecasts, their analysis provides indication
that synergies projections by insiders may overstate the available merger-related gains.
Indeed, insidersincentives to provide synergies forecasts that are in fact informative are
likely a¤ected by many aspects of the M&A process, such as the need to win over share-
holder and regulatory approval, competition by other potential bidders, and the existence of
proprietary, litigation, and/or reputation costs. Therefore, whether the availability of insid-
ersforecasts is indication that potential synergies exist and whether the implied gains are
economically relevant are empirical questions, which we address in this study.
In our main tests, we estimate the relation between ex ante and ex post measures of
merger performance and the availability of synergies projections as well as the gains implied
by the forecasts. To begin, we analyze how merging rmscombined abnormal returns around
8Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2000) argue that earlier studies su¤er from methodological problems that a¤ect the
analysis of long-term returns in general and advocate adopting the calendar-time portfolio approach because
it is robust to most of those problems, including the clustering of merger events (see also Barber and Lyon,
1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Fama, 1998; Brav, 2000).
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merger announcements vary with the availability of insidersprojections and their magnitude,
when available. Moreover, we estimate a model of predictablesynergies based on observable
deal characteristics. Based on the estimates from this model, we assess the relation between
the market participants reaction to mergers and the residual portion of the forecasts for
deals that have them, as well as expectations of synergies for those that do not.
We then focus on post-merger performance measures. Here, rst, we conduct an analysis
similar to the one just described using post-merger changes in industry-adjusted operating
performance - i.e., return on assets and operating expenses to sales ratios (equivalent to one
minus operating margin). Second, we examine whether the post-merger stock performance
is related to ex ante expectations and ex post realizations of synergies. In particular, on
the one hand, we estimate long-term calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns conditional
on management forecast availability. On the other, we test whether a merged entitys ability
to deliver the projected gains and investorsex ante assessement of management projection
may explain the post-merger performance puzzledocumented in prior studies.
3. Description of the sample and insidersforecasts of synergies
The sample consists of M&A deals between companies listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or
AMEX that were announced between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2005 and are in the
Securities Data Company (SDC) database. We restrict the initial sample to acquisitions of
assets, acquisitions of a majority interest, or mergers where the bidder holds less than 50%
of the targets common stock on the o¤er date and the deal has come to a resolution (i.e.,
completed or withdrawn). Furthermore, we discard o¤ers by the same bidder that are less
than 20 days apart, resulting in a sample of 3,935 unique announcements of merger o¤ers -
see Appendix A.1 for further details.
Table 1 presents the distribution of o¤ers by calendar year and by bidder industry based
on Fama-Frenchs (1997) 12-industry classication. The frequency with which o¤ers become
public is consistent with the idea that mergers occur in waves and cluster by industry (e.g.,
Mitchell and Muhlerin (1997), Hartford (2005), Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), Bruner (2004,
2005)). The aggregate volume measured by the number of deals rises during the 1990s
reaching its peak toward the end of the decade followed by a notable decline. Moreover,
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the three most active sectors - i.e. Financial, Business Equipment and Electronics, and
Healthcare - account for almost 60% of the announcements.
[Insert Table 1 here]
For each deal, we inspect news stories and press releases published between the o¤er
announcement and its resolution to retrieve insiders projections of merger-related gains.
Deal-specic news stories and press releases are from all English sources on Factiva and
satisfy the criteria detailed in Appendix A.2.9 As shown in Table 1, management forecasts
of synergies are publicly available in 894 cases, or 22.7% of the sample.
3.1. Merger characteristics
Synergies communication strategies can be an important part of the M&A process.10 As
the evidence in Table 1 shows, however, publicly available forecasts of synergies by manage-
ment are common but not ubiquitous. The variation in forecast frequency across industries
and over time suggests there may be a systematic cost/benet trade-o¤ that determines
merger communication strategies. To further examine this aspect, we compare the charac-
teristics of deals with insidersprojections, Forecast sample, to those of all other deals, No
Forecast sample. This analysis sheds some light on the trade-o¤ that determines the avail-
ability and quality of synergies forecasts and, thus, their relevance, and is useful in assessing
the potential for self-selection bias.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for a large set of target, bidder, and deal charac-
teristics conditional on whether synergies forecasts are available.11 These characteristics are
typically used as proxies for merger motives and, thus, the potential for business combi-
nations to create (or destroy) value. For 31 (32) of the 37 measures, the mean di¤erence
9Appendix A.3 provides some representative extracts from articles and press releases that contain man-
agement forecasts of synergies.
10Lipin and Sirower (2003), for instance, state that "communications strategy can make the di¤erence
between success and failure of an acquisition by impacting every phase (including) shareholder approval
[...] investors performing their own due diligence use the information contained in press releases, investor
presentations, conference calls, and interviews to reach buy and sell decisions in the fast-moving equity
markets". See also Bruner (2005).
11Appendix C describes each variable in detail and the sources from which the necessary data are obtained.
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test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) supports rejection of the hypothesis that the Forecast and
No Forecast samples are drawn from the same distribution. The evidence is consistent with
the notion that the availability of forecasts may be systematically related to the existence
of potential synergies, as well as the net benets of communicating them to capital market
participants. Although the direction of causality is not obvious, the di¤erences across the two
samples indicate that the release of projections is not random and motivate the robustness
tests discussed in the next subsection and in Section 5, where we apply self-selection bias
corrections to our main tests (Heckman, 1979).
[Insert Table 2 here]
3.2. Types of synergies forecasts, valuation approach, and typical implied gains
Publicly available operating synergiesforecasts by management are most often explictly
associated with cost savings, 87.9% of the cases. When insiders rationalize these projections,
they tend to ascribe the savings to elimination of duplicate costs through layo¤s, combination
of production capabilities and administrative functions, increased purchasing power in input
markets, and elimination of redundant R&D and capital expenditure programs. In our
sample, insiders seldom project revenue increases, 4.7% of forecasts. This is perhaps not
surprising in light of the evidence in HJR (2001) that announcement returns does not reect
revenue enhancementsprojections, suggesting that revenue synergies may be a utopia or
that, because they are viewed as such, it is not worth forecasting them publicly. For 6.9% of
the forecasts, there is no explicit indication of the underlying driver.
The level of detail provided by insiders about the timing of the projected synergies varies
substantially. In 7.6% of cases, management forecasts cover multiple, consecutive years start-
ing in the rst post-completion year. In the remaining portion of the sample, however, the
projections are not as precise. In 16.9% of cases, the forecast is limited to the rst post-
completion year. In 25.5 % of cases, the forecast refers to annual synergies to be realized
between two to four years post-completion, but provides no guidance on all or some of the
intermediate years. In 43.6% of cases, the projection quanties annual gains with no indica-
tion about the timing. In 5.4% of cases, insiders forecast the cumulative amount of synergies
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to be realized during 3, 5, or 10 years after the deals completion, and nally, in 9 cases,
managers provide their own valuations of the synergies but no details about the underlying
cash ow prole.
Following previous studies, we use the discounted cash ow method to estimate the value
of after-tax synergies from insidersprojections (Kaplan and Ruback, 1995; Gilson et al.,
2000; HJR, 2001).12 This approach requires a well dened annual cash-ow prole and an
appropriate discount rate for each deal. For the forecasts lacking precision about the timing,
we make some assumptions to derive a suitable cash ow prole. In particular, when annual
forecasts are provided, we assume the last year projected is the steady-state level of synergies.
When we cannot apply this assumption (i.e., annual forecast with no timing or 5 and 10-year
cumulative forecasts), we assume synergies reach the steady-state in year 4 after completion
- or year 3, for 3-year cumulative forecasts. Whenever necessary, we assume annual synergies
grow at a rate of 100% until the steady-state is reached.13
The discount rate should reect the risk associated with the realization of the projections.
We assume the synergiesrisk prole is similar to that of the pre-merger cash ows and use the
weighted-average of the merging rmsunlevered equity return, ru, to discount the projected
gains. Similar to Kaplan and Ruback (1995), we adopt two separate approaches to estimate
ru. In the rst, we apply the CAPM model to the asset-weighted average of the merging
rmsunlevered equity beta. In the second, we apply the CAPM model to the asset-weighted
average of the merging rmsindustry unlevered equity beta. In both cases, we use an annual
risk premium of 7.5% and 10-year T-bond yield as the risk-free rate.14
Table 3 presents sample statistics for the projected operating synergy gains. In Panel A,
the projected operating synergies are scaled by the combined rmspre-merger revenues. The
synergistic cash-ows projected by insiders are economically signicant when compared to
typical time-series variation in rm fundamentals (e.g., Ou and Penman, 1989), and relative
to other corporate events typically associated with the attainment of operating e¢ ciencies.15
12We rely on managersown valuations in those nine case where they are provided and the analysis does
not require information about the underlying cash ow proles.
13Appendix B.1 describes the adjustments in greater detail.
14Appendix B.2 describes the valuation models in more detail.
15See, for instance, Brickley and Van Drunen (1990) for the case of internal corporate restructing.
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The implied mean (median) improvement in annual operating margins varies between 2.1%
(1.1%) and 2.9% (1.9%). The lower block of Panel A presents similar statistics when missing
forecast-years are lled based on the assumptions outlined above and detailed in Appendix
B.1. The remaining analysis is based on these adjusted forecasts.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Panel B summarizes four valuations of the net-of-tax projected synergies, which di¤er with
respect to the horizon (innite or ve years) and discount rate (merging rmsor industrys
unlevered equity rate of return). The value of the e¢ ciency gains is economically signicant,
both in dollar terms and when scaled by the combined pre-merger market equity, although
the magnitude is naturally sensitive to the assumed horizon. For the Perpetuity Model,
the mean (median) value of the net-of-tax total synergies is between $776 ($179) and 829
($190) million depending on the discount rate. When scaled by the combined market value
of equity as of 60 trading days prior to the date when the target is put in play, the mean
(median) gains vary between 14% (7.1%) and 13.2% (6.6%).16 These estimates are roughly
in line with those reported by HJR (2001), 13.1% (9.5%). The rst ve years account for
approximately one-quarter of the perpetuity value. Hence, while alternative discount rates
produce similar results, the valuations are notably sensitive to the synergy-horizon. In this
sense, it is noteworthy that insiders almost never disclose details about the appropriate
horizon.
3.3. What explains the value of operating gains projected by management?
Taking insidersprojections at face value, a large fraction of deals have the potential to
generate substantial operating gains for the companies involved. Whether insidersforecasts
of synergies reect the real potential of mergers to enhance e¢ ciency remains, however, an
open question. Here we address this question by analyzing how the projected gains vary with
merger characteristics typically used as proxies for merger motives: existence and magnitude
of merger synergies, severity of agency problems, hubris, and bidder overvaluation.
16We dene the put in playevent as the date on which a merger or acquisition o¤er for the same target
is rst made public in a sequence of bids that are no more than a calendar year apart from each other.
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Table 4 reports regression coe¢ cient estimates for the relations between the value of the
synergies normalized by the merging rmsequity and the merger characteristics. Columns
1-4 present Tobit regression estimates for four di¤erent specications.17 Column 5 reports the
second-step coe¢ cient estimates and their bootstrapped standard errors for the full model
including the self-selection correction derived by Heckman (1979). The (untabulated) rst-
step probit model for the decision to announce the forecasts includes as instruments the
number of analysts following the merging companies and the number of 13-F lers holding
their common stock.18 The last column reports mean marginal e¤ects for the variables that
are also included in the selection equation, following Sigelman and Zeng (1999). The Two-
Step Heckman estimates are fairly consistent with those from the full Tobit model.19
[Insert Table 4 here]
The projected operating gains vary with many of the factors suggested by neoclassical
theories (model 1). The synergies are higher for horizontal deals, which provide greater scope
for cost savings through economies of scale, bargaining power with suppliers, and elimination
of operating and administrative redundancies (see, for example, Comment and Jarrell, 1995;
Kaplan, 2000). The implied gains are strongly related to the merging rmsoperating per-
formance prior to the deal. They increase with bidder and target asset turnover ratios (i.e.,
Sales/Assets), suggesting that higher e¢ ciencies are available when the rmsproduction
scale is larger, and decrease with bidder and target return on assets (i.e., EBITDA/Assets),
suggesting that the ability to attain operating e¢ ciencies is bounded by the rmspre-merger
e¢ ciency. Moreover, the projected gains increase with the size of the target, but decrease
17We use the Tobit estimation because synergies are naturally left-censored at zero.
18Strictly speaking, estimation of Heckman selection models does not require exclusion restrictions for
identication purposes, because the model is identied by non-linearity (Li and Prahabla, 2005; Heckman
and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). To be conservative, we exeprimented with a number of specications adopting
various exclusion restrictions. The qualitative results turn out to be largely independent of the specication
of the model and, for sake of brevity, we only report one such specication.
19In few cases, there are di¤erences between the coe¢ cients estimates in the parsimonious versus the full
model. Because we allow the sample to vary across various specications depending on data availability, we
also estimated all the models with the most restricted sample for which all the data are available. The results
do not change materially when we use this sample (722) for all specications and are available upon request.
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with that of the bidder.20 This evidence suggests that the potential synergies directly de-
pends on the scope for trimming fatat the target rm, while acquisitions by larger acquirers
generate lower gains, consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004).
The e¢ ciency defenseunder the 1997 Merger Guidelines gives rms incentives to pro-
mote and possibly inate the expected e¢ ciency gains. This incentive is stronger when
merging rms have a larger market share and/or serve overlapping markets. The Tobit coef-
cient estimates on market share support this argument, yet, this relation is not statistically
signicant when we control for the incentives to provide forecasts. Moreover, the projected
synergies do not vary with whether the deal follows industry deregulation events or the degree
of merging rmsgeographic proximity, somewhat surprisingly.21 ;22
The relation between the projected operating gains and factors related to agency explana-
tions for mergers is, in principle, less clear. While deals motivated by managersself-interest
are more likely to be associated with lower synergies, management may also be more likely
to tout synergistic gains to rationalize the rms acquisition strategy. Financial leverage,
dividends, and institutional ownership are typically identied as bonding and monitoring
mechanisms that limit insidersopportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen,
1986; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). Conversely, acquirers excess cash holdings increase the
scope for wasteful deals (Harford, 1999). The evidence indicates that the projected synergies
are not signicantly related to the acquirers abnormal cash holdings and nancial leverage,
but vary directly with the bidders dividend payout ratio and the targets leverage ratio,
consistent with the theory.
Hubris can lead managers to overestimate the synergies available from mergers (Roll,
1986), and superior pre-merger performance may breed managersovercondence. Moreover,
20These e¤ects are robust to excluding relative size from the model and remain signicant at a 1% condence
level, although the estimated coe¢ cients are approximately 40% smaller. These specications are available
upon request.
21If regulation limits rmsability to pursue e¢ ciency-enhancing deals, the gains may be larger when such
barriers are removed - e.g., regulation restricting interstate bank mergers or contiguous utilities mergers.
22Admittedly, our measure of geographic proximity mainly reects the availability of administrative cost
savings, especially for large rms where the relation between headquarters and operating unitslocations is
weaker.
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mergers provide bidders an opportunity to use overvalued equity as currency (RhodesKropf
and Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). While bidders have incentives to tout
the benets of a merger to alleviate target shareholdersconcerns about receiving overval-
ued equity, the expected reputational and/or litigation costs of setting high performance
benchmarks may also be higher when using overvalued equity. The relevance of these consid-
erations should depend on the acquiring rms recent stock performance, relative valuation,
and volatility of equity prices. The evidence shows that bidders with higher asset market-
to-book ratios and better pre-merger stock performance release signicantly lower forecasts,
while the coe¢ cient estimates on the method of payment and the stock returns volatility are
not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Finally, the number of competing bidders is positively
associated with the forecasted gains, consistent with hightened competion when targets pro-
vide opportunities for larger gains, or bidders strategically releasing inated projections when
competition is heightened.
Overall, much of the cross-sectional variation in the projected merger-related gains is
explained by observable factors, including those typically associated with the existence and
magnitude of synergies, consistent with the notion that management forecasts may be eco-
nomically meaningful. In closing this discussion, it is also worth noting the signicantly
positive coe¢ cient estimate on the inverse Mills ratio in Model (5), which indicates a pos-
itive association between the (unexpected) decision to make projections available and the
projected operating gains.
4. Relation between merger performance and synergies forecasts
The gains projected by insiders are related to merger characteristics expected to proxy
for the existence and magnitude of synergies. In this section, we discuss our tests of the
the relation between three common measures of merger performance and the availability and
magnitude of insidersforecasts of synergies. One of these measures reects investorsexpec-
tations of synergies around merger announcements, combined cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR), and two reect their subsequent realizations, changes in operating performance and
post-merger abnormal returns.
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4.1. Do announcement returns reect management projections of operating syn-
ergies?
Table 5 presents mean and median merger announcement CARs by forecast availability,
Panel A, and their relation with management projections of synergies, Panel B. We measure a
deals CAR as the sum of daily residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimated
using the equity returns of the bidder and target value-weighted portfolio.23 The daily weights
are based on the rmsmarket value of equity at close of the previous trading day and adjusted
for the toehold of the bidder on the bid announcement date, following Bates, Lemmon, and
Linck (2005).24
[Insert Table 5 here]
The typical announcement CAR is positive and signicant at conventional condence
levels, independent of the window or forecast availability. Both mean and median announce-
ment CAR of Forecast deals, however, are signicantly higher than the CAR of deals without
management projections. This may be becasue Forecast deals are more likely to generate
larger synergies and, thus, to be accompanied by insidersforecasts. Or, because insiders
forecasts, almost always released together with or shortly following an o¤er announcement,
positively a¤ect investorsreaction to merger announcements.
Di¤erences in announcement CAR, however, may be due to uncertainty about deal com-
pletion, if the latter varies with forecast availability.25 Thus, we also analyze announcement-
23In particular, rst, we estimate the expected return model using at least 60 and as many as 250 daily
value-weighted portfolio returns in the pre-event window ending 60 trading days prior to the date when the
target is put in play.Then, we use the model estimates to compute the daily value-weighted portfolio return
residuals over the relevant event window, with weights adjusted for the toehold of the bidder on the bid
announcement date. The date when a target is put in playdemarcates the end of the pre-event window,
while the current bid announcement or completion dates demarcate the beginning of the post-event window.
24To limit the e¤ect of confounding events, we restrict the announcement analysis to deals where the
bidder announces no bid for other targets over the (-20, 20) announcement window, as dened in the text.
Similarly, we restrict the completion analysisto deals where the bidder announces no bid for other targets
over the (-20, 20) announcement-to-completion window, as dened in the text.
25Luo (2005) shows that announcement returns may also a¤ect, rather than simply reect, the likelihood
of completion.
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to-completion CAR. The typical announcement-to-completion CAR is positive and signicant
in the Forecast sample, mean=5.2% (median=4.2%), while it is not statistically signicant
for No Forecast deals, mean=-0.9% (median=-0.1%). Consistent with the announcement
returns, the di¤erences across the two samples are statistically signicant.
Panel B of Table 5 summarizes our tests of whether investorsreaction to mergers varies
with the value of synergies projected by management. The dependent variable is the risk-
adjusted CAR over the (-20, 20) announcement window (models 1 through 4) or announcement-
to-completion window (models 5 through 8).26 The explanatory variable of interest is the
projected synergies value (innite horizon and rm-based discount rate) normalized by the
combined pre-merger equity.27 Moreover, using the selection-adjusted model in Table 4, we
estimate the predictablesynergies for all deals, independent of forecast availability, as well
as the residualsynergies that could not be predicted based on observable merger character-
istics, for deals accompanied by insidersforecasts. For the models including these generated
regressors, we adjust standard errors following Wooldridge (2002).
Investorsreaction to mergers is directly related to the gains projected by management,
consistent with the idea that investorsassessment reects expectations of synergies. The
regression coe¢ cient estimates are statistically signicant and economically large: a 1%
increase in the normalized synergy value is associated, on average, with a 25 and 45 basis
points increase in the announcement and completion CAR, respectively. These magnitudes
are large, given that the standard deviation of the normalized synergies is approximately 20%
and the mean announcement and completion CAR are 3.3% and 5.2%, respectively. When
merger characteristics are included in the model (2 and 6) the relation between CAR and
forecasts becomes somewhat weaker, but remains statistically signicant at least at the 5%
probability level. This suggets that the market reaction reects synergies that are related
26We have repeated our analysis using market-adjusted returns, which for sake of brevity we do not report
because the results are very similar, and in particular the estimated slopes are nearly identical to those
reported in Table 5. These results are available upon request.
27We performed the same analysis using the ve-year horizon and/or the industry discount rate valuations.
Using the alternative discount rate to value the synergies does not materially a¤ect our results. Conversely,
and perhaps not surprisingly, the coe¢ cients estimates are substantially larger when we assume a ve-year
horizon for the synergies. These results are available upon request.
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to observable merger characteristics, as well as information contained in the forecasts that
could not be inferred from those factors included in our model.
The remaining models (3-4 and 7-8) focus on the predictable and residual synergies analy-
sis. In the Forecast sample, investors reaction to mergers is directly related to both the
predictable as well as the residual portion of the synergy value implied by management
projections. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that investorsbeliefs about the e¤ects of
mergers are uncorrelated with the residual information contained in management projections.
Moreover, there is a signicant positive relation between CAR and predictable synergies in
the sample of deals without projections. In particular, independent of forecast availabilty,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that investorsreaction capitalizes 100% of the changes in
predictable synergies by the time a deal is completed. Overall, the evidence supports to the
notion that investorsex ante assessment of mergers varies signicantly with the operating
synergies that business combinations have the potential to generate when and as projected
by insiders.
4.3. Does post-merger operating performance reect management projections of
synergies?
Here we test whether changes post-completion operating performance are consistent with
the notion that mergers deliver on management projections. For each completed deal, we cal-
culate the di¤erence between the average three-year post-completion operating performance
measure and the merging rmsvalue-weighted performance in the last year prior the deal
announcement:
X =
 P3
t=1Xt=3
 X 1;
Xt =
n
OperatingExpenses
Salest
; EBITDAt
Assetst
o
;
where t = f1; 2; 3g refers to the rst three scal years following completion, Xt is the industry-
year median-adjusted measure, and X 1 is the corresponding value-weighted measure for the
stand-alone rms in the last scal year prior to the o¤er announcement. Similar to the
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earlier tests, we eliminate completed deals by the same bidder whose measurement periods
overlap.28 ;29
[Insert Table 6 here]
Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the changes industry-adjusted operating performance when
completed deals are partitioned by whether insiders projections of synergies are publicly
available. Because this comparison may be a¤ected by the di¤erences between Forecast and
No Forecast deals documented in Table 2, we further condition the sub-sample formation
on these rm- and industry-level characteristics. In particular, pre-deal industry-adjusted
protability of the merging rms, their industry sales growth, and their industry horizontal
merger intensity.
The evidence shows that merging rms experience some cost savings that improve op-
erating margins, independent of whether management forecasts are available. The typical
improvement in industry-adjusted operating margins is economically and statistically signif-
icant, as implied by a mean (median) reduction of operating costs-to-sales of 3.5% (0.63%)
and 1.4% (0.8%) in the No Forecast and Forecast samples, respectively. There is mixed evi-
dence, however, on whether the cost savings improve asset protability. The typical change
in industry-adjusted ROA is positive, but the mean change is statistically signicant in the
No Forecast sample only. Regardless of the measure, however, we cannot reject the hypotesis
that the two samples are drawn from the same distribution, and this inference is largely un-
a¤ected when Forecast and No Forecast deals are matched on pre-deal protability, industry
growth, and merger activity. Thus, in contrast with the earlier evidence for investorsexpec-
28The evidence in Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) suggests that shareholders of non-serial bidders
fare better on announcement of merger o¤ers. While there is some debate about the interpretation of this
empirical regularity, it is possible that serial acquirers make worse acquisitions and, thus, that eliminating
serial acquisitions by the same bidder may bias the analysis in favor of nding that synergies exist. This re-
striction, however, provides a cleaner sample to assess whether merger performance is related to management
projections of synegies.
29We repeated this analyis using Phillips and Horberg (2010) approach, measuring operating performance
changes relative to the rst post-merger year and obtain similar results, available upon request from the
authors.
18
tations, these results cast some doubt on the notion that the availability of insidersforecasts
may distinguish deals that are more likely to result in operating performance improvements.
Panel B of Table 6 reports linear regression coe¢ cient estimates for the relation between
the post-completion changes in industry-adjusted operating performance and management
projections of merger-related gains. Here, we redene the synergies measure as follows for
consistency with the operating performance measures:
Synergies = 1
3

3P
t=1
TSt
Yt
where t = f1; 2; 3g refers to the rst three years following the merger completion, TSt are
the total synergistic cash ows forecasted for year t, and Yt = fSalest; Assetstg. As in
our earlier tests, we also decompose the synergy measure into a predictable and a residual
component by re-estimating the selection-adjusted model presented in Table 4, and adjust
the coe¢ cient standard errors following Wooldridge (2002) when we include these generated
regressors.
There is a positive and statistically signicant relation between management projections
of synergies and changes in protability, model 1. A 1% increase in average synergies pro-
jected for the rst three years is associated with a predicted increase of 49 basis points in
industry-adjusted ROA. Thus, the relation is also economically signicant, given that the
mean (median) post-merger ROA change is 22 (20) basis points and a one standard devi-
ation of the synergy measure is approximately 1.5%. Higher projected synergies are also
associated with an approximately proportional improvement of the operating expense (i.e.,
prot margin) ratio (model 3).
In further contrast with the investorsexpectations analysis, however, including merger
characteristics in the model materially a¤ects the estimated relation between management
projections and merger performance. Specically, the positive relation between the projected
synergies and operating protability or margins becomes weaker and not signicant at con-
ventional levels. The remaining evidence in the table suggests this is due to the lack of
explanatory power of the residual portion of management projections of synergies. Indepe-
dent of forecast availability, the changes in industry-adjusted asset protability are directly
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related to the gains associated with merger characteristics, consistent with the notion that
predictable synergies exist. Yet, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the surprisein the
available forecasts represents random noise with respect to post-merger changes in operating
performance. Like for the univariate results, this is at odds with the earlier evidence for
how investors reaction to merger o¤er announcements varies with insidersprojections of
synergies.
4.4. Does the realization of synergies matter to investors?
The evidence suggests that investorsreaction to merger o¤er announcements may be
biased by the availability and magnitude of synergies projections released by insiders. Here
we analyze whether the post-completion abnormal stock returns reconcile the apparent dis-
crepancy between how ex ante and ex post measures of merger performance are related to
management forecasts.
Table 7 reports average post-merger monthly abnormal returns for completed deals parti-
tioned by whether management projections of synergies are available. We estimate abnormal
returns using the calendar-time portfolio approach advocated by Fama (1998) and used in
Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2000) analysis of post-merger returns, among others. For each cal-
endar month between January 1992 and December 2008, we form equal-weighted portfolios
of rms that complete mergers 1 to 36, or 7 to 42, or 13 to 48 months prior to the current
month.30 This progressive shift of the 36-month window aims to reect the arrival of new
information to investors as rms begin to integrate their operations and their post-merger
nancial reports become available. For each window, we form three calendar-time portfolios:
a portfolio long in Forecast deals; a portfolio long in No Forecast deals; and a portfolio long
in Forecast deals and short in No Forecast ones. Finally, we estimate the average monthly
abnormal return of each portfolio as the intercept of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.31
30We performed a similar analysis using value-weighted portfolios, which we do not present for sake of
brevity. Consistent with the evidence in Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2000), the long-portfoliosalphas are typically
higher when we use value-weighted portfolios. However, important for our purposes, the evidence for the
long/short-portfoliosalphas is qualitatively similar to the one presented in Table 7.
31Using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model yields similar results, available from the authors.
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[Insert Table 7 here]
As shown in Panel A, on average, the Long Forecast portfolio earns statistically signicant
negative abnormal returns - between -27.4 and -31.4 basis points per month depending on
the model and completion horizon. The mean risk-adjusted return of the Long No Forecast
portfolio is mostly insignicant and increases as the portfolio formation window shifts back
in time, becoming signicantly positive for the 13-to-48 months window. The mean alpha of
the Long/Short portfolio is uniformly negative and signicant. This evidence is consistent
with the idea that long-run returns reconcile the discrepancy between merger announcement
returns and operating performance with respect to the availability of synergies forecasts by
insiders.
As previously discussed for the post-merger operating performance, the systematic dif-
ferences between the Forecast and No Forecast deals may a¤ect our inference. For instance,
Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) nd that acquirers long-term
abnormal returns depend on the merger nancing method and acquirerspre-merger book-
to-market ratios (see also Mitchell and Sta¤ord, 2000). Table 2 shows that Forecast and
No Forecast deals di¤er signicantly along these dimensions. Therefore, in the remaining
portion of Table 6, we repeat the analysis controlling for these factors and only report alphas
of the Long/Short portfolios matched on these characteristics, for sake of brevity.32 Further-
more, similar to Table 6 and for similar reasons, we also repeat the analysis conditioning
portfolios on pre-merger protability of the merging rms, their industry sales growth, and
their industry horizontal merger intensity. With few exceptions (i.e. low growth industries),
the portfolio formation restrictions have little e¤ect on our earlier inferences, although the
magnitude of the annualized Long/Short portfolios abnormal returns varies substantially
depending on the portfolio groupings, between 3% and 12% per year.
Thus, overall, post-merger stock returns appear to reconcile the discrepancy between how
announcement returns and post merger operating performance relate to synergies forecasts
availability. The negative average post-merger abnormal return in the Forecast sample is also
32The intermediate group produces results very similar to the high group, which we do not report for sake
of brevity.
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consistent with realizations of merger-related gains that are systematically lower than implied
by management forecasts. This interpretation may also explain the discrepancy documented
earlier between how investorsex ante reaction and ex post changes in operating performance
relate to the surprisecomponent of the forecasted synergies.
Indeed, in a simple one period framework where managers forecast synergies equal to SM ,
investors pre-completion reaction capitalizes some fraction  of management projections,
SST =   SM , and the merged entity delivers a fraction  of the forecasted gains at the end
of the period, S =   SM , the post-completion realized returns can be expressed as:
RLT =
S
SST
  1 = 

  1; or (1)
log(1 +RLT ) = log()  log(): (2)
Therefore, if investorspost-completion assessment reects the realization of synergies,
the long-term stock performance should be positively related to the merged rms ability to
deliver the projected gains relative to investorspre-completion expectations, 

. Moreover,
in the log-transformed model of realized returns, changes in log() and log() should have
opposite e¤ects of similar magnitude.
Table 8 reports linear regression estimates of the relations in equations (1) and (2) above.
The dependent variable is either the rm-level post-completion annualized alpha estimated in
calendar time using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, or the natural log of one plus alpha.
For completed deals that are accompanied by forecasts, whenever possible, we separately
estimate the intercept of the Carhart model in each of the three post-completion calendar
years, using daily excess rm and factors returns. For each merger-year estimation, we require
that at least 125 daily observations be available and that the merged entity completes no
other deal in that calendar year or the previous two. The estimated daily alpha is then
multiplied by 250 to obtain an annualized measure of abnormal returns. The synergies
delivery, , and capitalization, , ratios are dened as:
 =
h
1 + 
 
EBITDA
Assets

1 3
i
=

1 + 1
3

3P
t=1
TSt
Assetst

 = [1 + CAR(Ann 20 to Compl20)] =
h
1 + PV (After Tax Tot Syn)
(MarketCap)
i
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where 
 
EBITDA
Assets

1 3 is the post-completion three-year average raw ROA minus the pre-
announcement asset value-weighted ROA, 1
3

3P
t=1
TSt
Assetst
is the three-year average projected an-
nual synergies normalized by assets, CAR(Ann 20 to Compl20) is the (-20, 20) announcement-
to-completion four-factor CAR, and PV (After TaxTotSyn)
(MarketCap)
is the value of after-tax total synergies
normalized by the pre-merger combined equity. Following Petersen (2009), standard errors
in Panel A are clustered by deal and calendar year to account for deal-level time-series and
year-level cross-sectional correlations of returns.33
[Insert Table 8 here]
The evidence in the table supports the hypothesis that investorspost-merger assessment
is related to the merged entitys ability to deliver the projected gains relative to investors
pre-completion expectations, whether we control for deal characteristics or not. Furthermore,
consistent with equation 2 above, we cannot reject the hypothesis that synergiesex post
delivery and ex ante capitalization ratios have opposite e¤ects of equal magnitude on post-
completion abnormal returns. Finally, the median regression estimates for the same models
reported in Panel B show that this inference is not driven by few outliers.
5. Robustness: the e¤ect of self-selection bias
The univariate analysis in Table 2 provides strong indication that the decision to release
synergies projections varies systematically with merger characteristics. Moreover, the analysis
in Table 4 shows that the propensity to disclose forecasts is directly related to the magnitude
of the projected synergies. It is possible that the analysis in section su¤ers from a similar
self-selection bias.
To address this issue, we re-estimate the relation between merger performance and the
availability and magnitude of synergies forecasts controlling for the e¤ect of systematic vari-
ation in the decision to release synergies forecasts. Specically, for the univariate tests, we
33We are grateful to Mitch Petersen for making his code available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/
faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm.
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estimate jointly a treatment-e¤ect model that relates each performance measure to an indica-
tor variable for the availability of management forecasts and a model characterizing insiders
decision to provide projections. In the same spirit, we estimate the performance-synergies
relation jointly with the decision to disclose synergies forecasts. We include in the selection
model the same explanatory variables used in the Two-Step Heckman model presented in
Table 4. Maximum-likelihood estimates of these models are presented in Tables 9 and 10.34
Table 9 reports estimates of the models relating ex ante and ex post merger performance
to the availability of management forecasts. Table 10 reports estimates of the models relating
the performance measures to the projected synergies. The evidence in Table 9 is qualitatively
similar to the one presented in Tables 5 and 6. There is, however, indication that some of
our inferences actually become stronger when we control for the non-random nature of the
Forecast and No Forecast samples. Similarly, across all panels of Table 10, the coe¢ cient
estimates are not materially di¤erent from those reported in Tables 5 and 6. With the only
exception of the operating performance models for the No Forecasts sample, the correlation
between the selection and outcome equationsresiduals is typically low and not signicantly
di¤erent from zero. Therefore, overall, it does not appear that the inferences drawn from the
earlier tests change when the choice to disclose - or to not disclose - projections is modeled
jointly with the relation between merger performance and the availability and magnitude of
synergies forecasts.
6. Conclusions
Merging rmsinsiders universally portray M&A as having the potential to benet all rel-
evant stakeholders. This is perhaps not surprising given the enormous investment of resources
often required and the epochal changes that often result. This attitude is also consistent with
neoclassical theories that characterize mergers as rmsrational reaction to a changing envi-
ronment. During the 1990s, insiders have shown increasing propensity to rationalize merger
deals publicly by quantifying their expected operating synergies. At face value, the gains im-
34Alternatively, we also estimate the self-selection structural model using the two-step approach described
in Heckman (1979) and obtain similar results, available upon request.
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plied by these forecasts are economically large. In this study, we test whether merger-related
synergies indeed exist by examining the relation between traditional ex ante and ex post
measures of merger performance and the availability and magnitude of insidersprojections.
The evidence shows that investorsex ante assessment of mergers is directly related both
to the availability of management projections and their implied gains, consistent with the
idea that operating synergies are indeed an important determinant of (expected) merger
performance. Supporting the existence of actual synergies, post-merger operating perfor-
mance is directly related to the projected synergies and, in particular, to the portion of those
gains that is predictable based on observable deal characteristics. There are, however, no-
table di¤erences between the ex ante and ex post evidence, as realized changes in operating
performance are not related to the availability of forecasts or the surprise they convey. Post-
merger long-term returns reconcile these discrepancies, partly explaining the post-merger
performance puzzle, and consistent with the notion that the ability of rms to deliver the
projected synergies is a signicant determinant of post-merger stock returns. Overall, the
evidence supports the idea that market participants reward the availability of synergies fore-
casts ex ante in proportion to the implied gains, but later use them as economically relevant
yardsticks to judge the success of M&A.
We focus on mergers between publicly traded companies, but it is conceivable that the
ndings may extend to acquisitions of private rms and other strategic alliances. Also,
although we focus on the simple, yet fundamental question pertaining the existence of syn-
ergies, there may be fruitful areas for future research that analyzes management forecasts
of synergies. First, further work seems warranted on the economic determinants of merger
communication strategies and how the projected synergies a¤ect other elements of the merger
process. Second, it may be interesting to investigate the factors that a¤ect the credibility
of synergies projections ex ante and the merged rms ability to deliver those gains ex post.
Finally, given the evidence that synergy-related disappointments are costly to shareholders,
it may be natural to investigate whether they also impose private costs on merging rms
insiders in the form of litigation, reputational losses, and/or job-security.
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Appendix A.1 - SDC Query
We perform the following query on the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Companys Mergers
and Acquisitions database to obtain a list of deals between publicly traded companies (NYSE,
NASDAQ, and AMEX) involving US targets, announced between January 1, 1990 and December
31, 2005. The query is restricted to proposed deals that are acquisitions of assets, acquisitions of a
majority interest, or mergers where the bidder holds an absolute minority stake in the target at the
time of the announcement and the deal has come to a resolution (i.e. completed, unconditional, or
withdrawn).
Step Number of Hits Search Criteria
0 - DATABASES: Domestic Mergers, 1979-Present (MA, OMA)
1 - Date Announced: 01/01/1990 to 12/31/2005 (Custom) (Calendar)
2 67,711 Acquiror Stock Exchange : A, NM, N
3 19,239 Target Stock Exchange : A, NM, N
4 4,433 Deal Type: 1, 2
5 4,235 Form of the Deal: AA, AM, M
6 4,234 Percent of Shares Held by Acquiror at Announcement: LO to 50
7 4,017 Deal Status : C, U, W
Eighty-two deals are further eliminated for the purpose of our analysis, either because the
proposed deal involves more than two companies (i.e. the sample excludes M&A o¤ers by the same
bidder that are less than two days apart) or because the observation is a later bid for the same
target by the same bidder occurring less than 365 days after the earlier bid. The initial sample
ultimately comprises of 3,935 unique M&A announcements.
Appendix A.2 Factiva Query
We perform a keyword search on Factiva for each of the 3,935 deals in the initial sample
to collect managements public forecasts of merger-related gains. For each deal, we impose the
following criteria when retrieving related news stories and press releases:
a) FACTIVA Keyword Search Window : (Variations of Target Nameand Variations of Bidder
Name) and (merger* or acquisition* or tender*) and (earn* or pro* or syne* or enha* or add or
addi* or accre* or contrib* or save or cost* savi* or savi* or reve* incr* or incr* or decr* or redu*
or CUT or cutt* or dilut* or neutr* or impro* or econ* of scal* or expec* or anticip*)
b) FACTIVA Date Range Window : From (Announcement Date-7) To (Completion/Withdrawal
Date)
c) FACTIVA Included Sources Window: Business Wire: Dow Jones Business News; Dow Jones
News Service; Mergers & Acquisitions Report; Mergers & Acquisitions: The Dealmakers Journal;
Mergers & Acquisitions Litigation Reporter; PR Newswire; Reuters News; Seeking Acquisitions:
FirstList; The Wall Street Journal
Appendix A.3 Examples of news stories and press releases containing insiders
forecasts of merger-related gains
Following are extracts from some news stories and press releases that include managerial fore-
casts of merger-related gains. The relevant sections are in italics.
Example 1: Bell Atlantic, GTE Merger -4: Cost Synergies Within 3 Yrs. 28 July
1998, Dow Jones News Service: Bell Atlantic and GTE said based on anticipated revenue and
cost synergies, the transaction is expected to add to earnings per share [. . . ] The companies said
in a joint press release Tuesday that they see the transaction producing cost synergies totaling $2
30
billion within three years of the deals completion. The merged company is also expected to generate
an additional $2 billion in revenue synergies.
Example 2: Newell Faces a Big Challenge in Rubbermaid Takeover  It Hopes
NewellizationCan Revitalize Household-Products Maker. 3 November 1998, The
Wall Street Journal: Newell Co., renowned for squeezing costs out of acquired companies, faces
a tough test in its proposed $5 billion acquisition of Rubbermaid Inc. [. . . ] Newell Chief Executive
John McDonough is promising that the merger plan, announced late last month, will deliver $300
million to $350 million in synergies by 2000, 25% of that from selling Rubbermaid products to
Newell customers. [. . . ] Newell hopes Rubbermaid will accelerate the combined companys growth.
Besides the usual cost savings, Mr. McDonough predicts the merger will produce $70 million to $90
million in new sales by 2000 as Newell introduces its customers to Rubbermaid. [. . . ]
Example 3: Food Lion Will Buy Hannaford For About $3.3 Billion, Plus Debt. 19
August 1999, Dow Jones Business News: Food Lion Inc. Wednesday conrmed it will acquire
supermarket operator Hannaford Bros. Co. for about $3.3 billion in cash and stock, a deal that
would create the sixth-largest food retailer in the U.S. [. . . ] The combined Food Lion and Hannaford
will have nearly $14 billion in pro-forma annual revenue. The combined company is expected to result
in synergies estimated at about $40 million in the rst year and about $75 million annually by the
third year. Operations that may be a¤ected include distribution, information systems, training and
marketing. [. . . ]
Example 4: Hilton to buy Promus Hotel for $4 billion. 7 September 1999, Reuters
News: Hilton Hotels Corp. on Tuesday said it would buy Promus Hotel Corp. for $4 billion in
cash, stock and debt, creating a giant with 1,700 hotels and operations in almost every segment of
the industry. [. . . ] The combined company will have pro forma 2000 EBITDA of $1.3 billion, and
result in annual cost savings and operating e¢ ciencies of about $55 million in the rst year and
$90 million thereafter. [. . . ]
Example 5: Kroger to merge with Fred Meyer. 19 October 1998, Reuters News:
Kroger Co said Monday it would merge with Fred Meyer in a deal that creates the nations largest
grocer. The 1-for-1 stock swap is valued at about $13 billion including debt. A full text of the
companys press release follows. [. . . ] Kroger plans to generate annual cost savings of approximately
$225 million within three years, including approximately $75 million in the rst year. Kroger plans
to generate these savings through combined procurement of goods and services, reduced corporate
overhead, in-market synergies, and consolidation of support services. [. . . ]
Example 6: Unicom, Peco Conrm Plans To Merge, Create Utility-Industry Gi-
ant. 23 September 1999, Dow Jones Business News: Chicago-based Unicom Corp. and
Philadelphia-based Peco Energy Co. Thursday formally announced plams to merge in a deal they
valued at more than $8 billion. [. . . ] The merger will boost earnings in the rst year after the deal
closes, excluding one-time merger-related charges, the companies said. They expect annual cost sav-
ings of $100 million in the rst year, growing to $180 million by the third year. The majority of the
savings will come from eliminating redundant corporate and administrative positions and programs.
Example 7: Amax Inc., Cyprus Minerals merger to create $5 billion company. 25
May 1993, Reuters News: Amax Inc. and Cyprus Minerals Co., two of the nations biggest
metals producers, said Tuesday they plan a corporate marriage that will create a new company 
Cyprus-Amax with assets of $5 billion. [. . . ] The combined coal operations will produce more
than 70 million tons of coal a year and strong oil and gas and lithium businesses, Ward said. "The
combination of the companies will present signicant opportunities to reduce operating and corporate
and divisional overhead costs, with anticipated annual cost savings of at least $100 million," he said.
But the cost-cutting, he said, may result in job cuts. Cyprus has already completed a restructuring
that has trimmed 650 jobs in the past year. [. . . ]
Example 8: Viatel/Synergies -2: Sees $500M Savings Over 5 Yrs. 27 August 1999,
Dow Jones News Service: Viatel Inc. (VYTL) expects its planned acquisition of Destia Com-
munications Inc. (DEST) to generate cost savings of $500 million over ve years, company o¢ cials
said in a press conference Friday. [. . . ].
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Appendix B.1 Adjustment to raw forecasts
Sometimes insiders provide time tables specifying the magnitude of the annual synergy gains
expected to be realized during intermediate years before the benets of the merger fully materialize.
In the majority of cases, however, managersprojections are not as detailed. In some cases, the
forecast is limited to the rst post-completion year. In other cases, the forecast refers to annual
synergies expected between two to four years post-completion, but provides no guidance on all
or some of the intermediate years. In other cases, the forecast quanties annual gains with no
indication about the timing. Finally, in other cases, insiders disclose the cumulative amount of
synergies expected to be realized over 3, 5, or 10 years after the deals completion.
In general, when annual forecasts are provided, we always assume that the last projected year
is the steady-state level of synergies. When no detail about the timing is provided (i.e. single
annual forecast with no timing or 5- or 10-year cumulative forecasts), we assume the steady-state
level is reached in year 4 after completion. Whenever necessary (i.e. cumulative forecasts or annual
forecast with no timing or annual forecast with missing intermediate years), similar to HJR (2001),
we assume that expected synergies grow at a rate of 100% until the steady-state is reached.
Therefore, if managers forecast annual gains of x dollars by year t, where t > 1 (or provide no
timing, in which case we assume t = 4), we assume the merged entity realizes x=2 in year t   1,
x=4 in year t  2, and so forth until year 1 after completion of the merger is reached. If managers
forecast annual gains of x dollars by year t and y dollars by year t+ i, where i > 1, we interpolate
the expected synergy gains for the intermediate years, assuming the gains increase linearly over the
missing forecast years. When a cumulative forecast is provided, we adopt the following convention.
For a 3-year cumulative forecast equal to x, we assume the rst year forecast is equal x=7, the
second 2x=7, and the third 4x=7. For a 5-year cumulative forecast equal to x, we assume the rst
year forecast is equal x=23, the second 2x=23, the third 4x=23, and 8x=23 in each remaining year.
For a 10-year cumulative forecast equal to x, we assume the rst year forecast is equal x=63, the
second 2x=63, the third 4x=63, and 8x=63 in each remaining year.
Appendix B.2 Valuation of merger-related synergies forecasts
To estimate the present value of the merger-related incremental cash ows projected by man-
agement, we follow Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Gilson et al. (2000), and HJR (2001). In particular,
after adjusting the raw data as described in Appendix B.1, we compute the present value of the
after-tax synergistic cash ows assuming they are realized in perpetuity as:
PV (Synergies) =
5P
t=i
(1 0:36)TSt
(1+r)t +
(1 0:36)TSi+5
r(1+r)i+5
where i = 1+ Number of Months to Completion12 ; (1  0:36)TSt is the after-tax synergy forecast for the tth
year after completion, assuming a at 36% tax rate; r is the discount rate; and Number of Months
to Completion is, for completed deals, the actual number of months to completion or, for withdrawn
deals, the average number of months to completion of completed deals in the same target industry
based on Fama-French (1997) 49-industry classication. In the 5-year Model, the present value of
synergies is restricted to the rst element on the right-hand side of the equation above.
Following Kaplan and Ruback (1995), we obtain two estimates of synergies discount rate,
ru, which we label Firm Discount Rate and Industry Discount Rate. In the Firm Discount Rate
model, ru is the weighted-average of the merging rmscost of unlevered equity, using as weights
the rms pseudo-market value of assets  i.e. market value of common equity, E, plus book
value of long-term debt, D, and liquidation value of preferred equity, P , measured 60 trading
days prior to when the target company is put in play. To calculate each merging rms cost of
unlevered equity: 1) we estimate the rms equity beta, E , using at least 60 and at most 250
daily rm stock returns and the CRSP value-weighted portfolio returns ending 60 days prior to
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when the target is put in play; 2) we assume the rmsdebt and preferred equity betas, D and
P , are equal to 0.25; 3) assuming a at 36% tax rate, we calculate the unlevered equity beta
as U = [(EE + PP + 0:64DD) = (E + P + 0:64D)]; 4) we apply the CAPM equation to the
unlevered equity beta, U , assuming a 7:5% risk-premium and setting the risk-free rate equal to the
10-year Treasury bond yield at the time of the announcement.
In the Industry Discount Rate model, based on the Fama and French (1997) 49-industry clas-
sication, ru is the weighted-average of the merging rmsindustry cost of unlevered equity, using
as weights the rmspseudo-market value of assets as dened above. To compute a rms industry
cost of unlevered equity, we use all rms that are in the relevant Fama-French industry in the scal
year prior to when the target is put in playand have the necessary data in the CRSP/Compustat
merged database. In particular, for each merging rm: 1) we estimate the relevant industry equity
beta, IE , using at least 60 and at most 250 daily returns for a value-weighted portfolio of all rms
in the relevant industry and the CRSP value-weighted portfolio returns ending 60 days prior when
the target is put in play; 2) we assume the industry debt and preferred equity betas, ID and 
I
P ,
are equal to 0.25; 3) assuming a at 36% tax rate, we calculate the relevant industry unlevered
equity beta as IU =
 
IEE
I + IPP
I + 0:64IDD
I

=
 
EI + P I + 0:64DI

, where EI , P I , and DI
are total industry values of common equity, preferred equity, and debt; 4) apply the CAPM equation
to the relevant industry unlevered equity beta, IU , assuming a 7:5% risk-premium and setting the
risk-free rate equal to the 10-year Treasury bond yield at the time of the announcement.
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Appendix C Denition of Variables
The table below provides the denition of rm and deal characteristics, their timing relative to the
merger event, and the source from which the data is obtained (in italics).
Variable Definition
Industry Affiliation
In Table 1, industries are defined using Kenneth French's algorithm to translate SIC codes into 12
industries. In all other tables, industries are defined using Kenneth French's algorithm to translate SIC
codes into 49 industries. (See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
Deal Completed
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the proposed deal is completed, 0 otherwise. A deal is deemed completed if
the bidder acquires an absolute majority of the target outstanding common shares or the bidder and the
target merge into a single entity as a result of the transaction, as reported by SDC.
Percent Cash (Equity) Continuous variable between 0 and 100, representing the percentage of the offer price paid in cash (bidderequity), as reported by SDC.
Num. of Comp. Bidders Number of competing offers for the same target, as reported by SDC.
Horizontal Deal Indicator variable equal to 1 if merging firms belong to the same industry, 0 otherwise. Industries aredefined using Kenneth French's algorithm to translate SIC codes into 49 industries.
Geographical Overlap
Discrete variable varying between 0 and 3: equal to 0 if the bidder is a foreign firm; equal to 1 if the
bidder is a US company; equal to 2 if the bidder' and target's headquarters are located in the same US
region; equal to 3 if the bidder' and target's headquarters are located in the same US state. Locations are as
reported by SDC.
Deregulation Window Indicator variable equal to 1 if a deal's announcement falls in the year of a deregulation event or in thesubsequent 3 years. Deregulation events are from Harford (2005) and Mitchell and Muhlerin (1996).
Sales/Assets Continuous variable equal to the ratio of the firm's sales to assets as reported on Compustat for the fiscalyear-ending prior to the bid announcement.
EBITDA/Sales Continuous variable equal to the ratio of the the firm's earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation andamortization to sales as reported on Compustat for the fiscal year-ending prior to the bid announcement.
EBITDA/Assets Continuous variable equal to the ratio of the firm's earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation andamortization to assets as reported on Compustat for the fiscal year-ending prior to the bid announcement.
Equity Market Cap Continuous variable equal the product of the firm's stock price and number of shares outstanding as of 60trading days prior to the first bid announcement date, as reported on CRSP.
Relative Market Cap Continuous variable bounded below at 0. In Table 2, it is the ratio of the target to the bidder Equity MarketCap. In all other tables, it is the ratio of the log(Equity Market Cap) of the target to that of the bidder.
Total Assets Continuous variable equal the (book) value of the assets on the firm's balance sheet as reported byCompustat for the last the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date.
Relative Assets Value Continuous variable bounded below at 0, equal to the ratio of the target to the bidder Total Assets.
Sales Market Share
Continuous variable varying between 0 and 1, equal to the ratio of merging firms’ sales to industry total
sales as reported on Compustat for the last the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date.
Industries are defined using Kenneth French's algorithm to translate SIC codes into 49 industries.
Tobin's Q
Continuous variable equal to the ratio of pseudo-market value to book value of the firm's assets. Pseudo-
market value of the firm's assets is the sum of common equity market value and book value of long-term
debt. Book value of the firm's assets is the sum of book value of common equity and long-term debt. All
value are as reported on Compustat for the fiscal year-ending prior to the bid announcement.
Num. of Analysts Number of equity research analysts following the firm in the quarter prior to the merger announcementdate, as reported by FirstCall.
Pct. Inst. Own.
Percent of the firm's common equity held by 13-F filers at the end of the quarter prior to the merger
announcement date. It is equal to the sum of all stocks held by 13-F filers divided by the number of shares
outstanding, as reported by Thompson Financial.
Num. of Inst. Owners Number of unique 13-F filers holding a positive stake of the firm's common equity at the end of thequarter prior to the merger announcement date, as reported by Thompson Financial.
Debt/Assets
Continuous variable equal to the ratio of the firm's long-term debt to pseudo-market value of assets.
Pseudo-market value of the firm's assets is the sum of common equity market value and book value of
long-term debt. All value are as reported on Compustat for the last the fiscal year-ending prior to the bid
announcement.
Stock Price Run-up Continuous variable equal to the company's common stock raw return during the 11-month period ending1 month prior to the bid announcement. Returns data are as reported on CRSP.
Stock Ret. Volatility Continuous variable equal to the company's common stock volatility, measured as the standard deviationof daily returns during the 11-month period ending 1 month prior to the merger announcement date.
Ind-adj cash balance Continuous variable equal to the firm's cash balance minus the industry-year average cash balance, asreported on Compustat for the last the fiscal year-ending prior to the bid announcement.
Dividend/ Cash-flow Continuous variable equal to the total dividend paid divided by EBITDA as reported on Compustat for thelast the fiscal year-ending prior to the bid announcement.
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Table 1 – Number of M&A Offers, Proportion of Deals with Operating Synergies Forecasts, and Proportion of Deals 
Completed by Year and Industry. This table reports the number of merger and acquisition offers announced between Jan. 1, 
1990 and Dec. 31, 2005. The initial sample is obtained from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum imposing the restrictions 
described in Appendix A.1. Year is the calendar year in which a deal is announced; Fama-French Industry is the bidder industry 
affiliation to one of twelve industries as described in Appendix C; Num. of Deals is the number of deals announced; Disclose 
Synergies Forecasts is the percentage of offers accompanied by insiders forecasts of merger-related (Cost and/or Revenue, or 
Total) synergies; Completed Deal is the percentage of deals ultimately completed. 
 
Year 
Num.  
of 
Deals 
Disclose 
Synergies 
Forecasts 
Completed
Deal   
Fama-French 
Industry  
Num. 
of 
Deals 
Disclose 
Synergies 
Forecasts 
Completed
Deal 
1990 112 1.8% 70.5% Utilities 129 42.6% 72.9% 
1991 128 8.6% 69.5% Chemicals  60 33.3% 86.7% 
1992 124 12.9% 75.0% Energy (Oil, Gas) 140 30.7% 85.0% 
1993 161 13.7% 78.9% Financial 1,191 28.0% 88.8% 
1994 244 15.6% 79.1% Manufacturing 272 24.6% 81.6% 
1995 281 21.4% 83.3% Other 333 23.1% 78.1% 
1996 310 21.3% 82.6% Telecom 218 22.9% 79.8% 
1997 383 22.5% 84.6% Wholesale 233 22.7% 81.1% 
1998 422 26.5% 87.7%  
Non-Durable 
Goods 134 19.4% 83.6% 
1999 432 22.5% 84.7% Healthcare 376 18.4% 82.4% 
2000 366 21.6% 86.6%  
Bus. Equip. & 
Elec. 793 11.9% 87.6% 
2001 283 24.4% 88.0% Durables Goods 56 10.7% 80.4% 
2002 167 22.2% 91.6%   
2003 182 30.2% 92.3%   
2004 177 47.5% 91.0%   
2005 163 36.8% 92.6%   
All years 3,935 22.7% 84.6% All industries 3,935 22.7% 84.6% 
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Table 2 – Merger Characteristics by Availability of Management Forecast of Synergies. The table reports summary statistics 
for deal and merging firm characteristics, conditional on whether insiders disclose synergies projections (No Forecast vs. 
Forecast). The initial sample is obtained from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum imposing the restrictions described in 
Appendix A.1. All variables are defined in Appendix C. P-value t-test (Wilcoxon) provides the two-sided p-value of the t-test 
(rank-sum test) under the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from the same distribution. Dollar figures are inflation-
adjusted using the Consumer Price Index and expressed in 2005 dollars. 
 
  No Forecast   Forecast   P-value 
N Mean Median StDev N Mean Median StDev t-test Wilcoxon 
Deal characteristics 
Deal Completed 3,041 0.834 1 0.371 894 0.885 1 0.318 0.00 0.00 
Percent Cash 3,041 43.4 19.9 46.0 894 24.3 0 36.1 0.00 0.00 
Percent Equity 3,041 50.7 54.2 46.4 894 67.6 90.1 39.1 0.00 0.00 
Num. of Comp. Bidders 3,041 1.07 1 0.31 894 1.12 1 0.40 0.00 0.00 
Horizontal Deal 3,041 0.64 1 0.48 894 0.74 1 0.44 0.00 0.00 
Geographical Overlap 3,041 1.72 1 0.90 894 1.76 2 0.88 0.27 0.18 
Deregulation Window 3,041 0.084 0 0.277 894 0.100 0 0.301 0.13 0.13 
Relative Market Cap 2,699 0.275 0.102 0.461 869 0.487 0.318 0.550 0.00 0.00 
Relative Assets Value 2,651 0.437 0.161 0.766 844 0.598 0.389 0.704 0.00 0.00 
Bidder characteristics 
Sales/Assets 2,944 0.747 0.622 0.690 880 0.684 0.458 0.723 0.02 0.00 
EBITDA/Sales 2,844 0.083 0.182 0.659 851 0.203 0.221 0.274 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA/Assets 2,850 0.089 0.098 0.142 851 0.093 0.096 0.100 0.49 0.16 
Equity Market Cap 2,931 9,381 1,171 26,815 890 9,767 2,353 22,638 0.70 0.00 
Total Assets 2,960 10,097 1,288 26,862 881 18,621 4,259 36,519 0.00 0.00 
Sales Market Share 2,944 0.015 0.001 0.047 880 0.016 0.003 0.052 0.64 0.00 
Tobin's Q 2,872 2.25 1.48 2.05 869 1.68 1.28 1.10 0.00 0.00 
Num. of Analysts 3,041 3.7 1 5.1 894 5.2 4 5.6 0.00 0.00 
Pct. Inst. Own. 3,041 45.8 47.7 26.5 894 50.9 52.1 26.0 0.00 0.00 
Num. of Inst. Owners 3,041 176.7 97.8 224.0 894 214.8 145.5 213.4 0.00 0.00 
Debt/Assets 2,945 0.163 0.105 0.172 881 0.195 0.152 0.172 0.00 0.00 
Stock Price Run-up 2,893 0.306 0.175 0.730 888 0.248 0.190 0.508 0.03 0.54 
Stock Ret. Volatility 2,893 0.029 0.024 0.017 888 0.024 0.020 0.013 0.00 0.00 
Ind-adj cash balance 2,908 0.526 0.525 0.012 874 0.525 0.525 0.007 0.33 0.16 
Dividend/ Cash-flow 2,841 0.111 0.019 0.399 845 0.183 0.146 0.366 0.00 0.00 
Target characteristics 
Sales/Assets 2,690 0.900 0.738 0.801 853 0.729 0.531 0.736 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA/Sales 2,605 0.023 0.069 0.233 826 0.076 0.083 0.131 0.00 0.00 
EBITDA/Assets  2,584 -0.079 0.115 1.041 826 0.143 0.193 0.510 0.00 0.00 
Equity Market Cap 2,784 476 99 1,563 873 2,340 572 4,446 0.00 0.00 
Total Assets 2,699 925 155 3,785 855 5,271 1,268 10,126 0.00 0.00 
Sales Market Share 2,695 0.002 0.000 0.014 854 0.007 0.001 0.018 0.00 0.00 
Tobin's Q 2,636 1.91 1.27 1.71 846 1.57 1.19 1.10 0.00 0.02 
Num. of Analysts 3,041 1.2 0 2.4 894 3.6 2 4.4 0.00 0.00 
Pct. Inst. Own. 3,041 29.0 22.7 25.0 894 46.2 46.2 26.9 0.00 0.00 
Num. of Inst. Owners 3,041 38.0 19.0 53.6 894 111.6 73.0 111.9 0.00 0.00 
Debt/Assets 2,682 0.161 0.063 0.209 852 0.202 0.165 0.191 0.00 0.00 
Stock Price Run-up 2,762 0.115 0.047 0.627 871 0.163 0.124 0.513 0.04 0.00 
Stock Ret. Volatility 2,762 0.041 0.036 0.023   871 0.028 0.023 0.016   0.00 0.00 
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Table 3 – Projected Synergies. The table reports summary statistics for management projections of merger-related synergies. 
Panel A reports summary statistics of nominal management projections of operating synergies as a percentage of combined pre-
merger operating sales. The combined pre-merger operating sales are the sum of the merging firms’ stand-alone operating sales 
as reported in the fiscal year prior to when the target is ‘put in play’. Total Synergies is either the sum of cost and revenue 
synergies when a break-down is provided or the amount of projected total synergies when no break-down is provided. As 
Projected refers to management raw forecasts of synergies for year t after completion. Backward/Forward-Filled refers to the 
same projections after missing annual forecasts are derived as described in Appendix B.1. Year 1 (2, 3, 4) refers to the first 
(second, third, fourth) year after a deal is completed. As described in Appendix B.1, when no details are provided about the 
timing of annual synergies, we assume a steady-state is reached in year 4 following completion. Panel B reports summary 
statistics for the value of projected synergies expressed in millions of dollar or as a percentage of combined pre-merger market 
capitalization of equity. The latter is equal to the sum of the merging firms’ stand-alone market capitalization (i.e., number of 
common shares outstanding multiplied by stock price) measured 60 trading days prior to when the target is put in play and 
adjusted for the toehold position of the acquiring firm on the bid announcement date, following Bates, Lemmon, and Linck 
(2005). The valuation is based on the backward/forward filled projections described in Appendix B.1. The present value of 
projected synergies is computed following Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Gilson et al. (2000), and Houston, James, and Ryngaert 
(2001). Details about the valuation models are provided in Appendix B.2. Dollar figures are inflation-adjusted using the 
Consumer Price Index and expressed in 2005 equivalent. 
 
Panel A: Nominal synergies forecasts relative to combined pre-merger sales (%) 
Year 1  Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
N Mean Med SD  N Mean Med SD N Mean Med SD N Mean Med SD 
As Projected: 
287 2.1 1.1 2.9  283 2.3 1.6 2.5 156 2.9 1.9 3.7 377 2.9 1.7 4.8 
               
Backward/Forward-Filled: 
838 1.1 0.4 1.8   838 1.6 0.8 2.2   838 2.1 1.3 2.8   838 2.8 1.7 4.1 
 
Panel B: Present value of projected synergies 
    Firm Discount Rate   Industry Discount Rate 
N Mean Median SD Mean Median SD  
Perpetuity Model 
Total Syn. ($ Millions) 832 828.7 189.7 1868.2  775.8 178.6 1733.7 
 - scaled by market cap 825 14% 7.09% 20.33%   13.2% 6.64% 20.57% 
  5-year Model 
Total Syn. ($ Millions) 832 203.7 47 502.9  199.6 44.9 494 
 - scaled by market cap 825 3.38% 1.72% 5.21%   3.36% 1.67% 5.35% 
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Table 4 – Relation between Projected Synergies and Merger Characteristics. The table reports linear regression estimates for 
the relation between the value of projected synergies and bidder, target, and deal characteristics. The dependent variable is the 
present value of synergies from the Perpetuity Model scaled by the combined pre-merger market capitalization as defined in 
Table 3 Panel B. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. Columns 1-4 report Tobit regression maximum-likelihood 
coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parenthesis). Column 5, following Heckman (1979), reports second-step OLS 
estimates of the model that includes the Inverse Mills Ratio to correct for potential self-selection bias. In the Heckman two-step 
model, the mean marginal effects with corresponding standard errors (in parenthesis) are computed following Sigelman and Zeng 
(1999) for those variables also included in the selection equation. The selection model excludes the percentage of common stock 
held 13-F filers prior to the deal announcement, while including as explanatory variables of the decision to disclose projections 
the number of analysts following the merging firms and the number of 13-F filers holding merging firms’ common stock prior to 
the deal announcement. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance of the coefficient estimate at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% probability level, respectively. Pseudo-R2 is the model’s log-likelihood R-square. All models include year 
and industry fixed effects. 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(2) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(3) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(4) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(5) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Marg. 
Effect 
(SE) 
Intercept 0.7910*** 0.5458*** 0.4349*** 0.8693*** 0.6055*** (0.1360) (0.1076) (0.1110) (0.1446) (0.1815) 
Horizontal 0.0273** 0.0181 0.0218* 0.0187(0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0120) (0.0000)
Geographical Overlap -0.0073 -0.0086 -0.0071 -0.0078(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0000)
Sales/Assets (B) 0.0166 0.0205* 0.0301** 0.0227(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0136) (0.0001)
Sales/Assets (T) 0.0208* 0.0329*** 0.0376*** 0.0334(0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0124) (0.0001)
EBITDA/Assets (B) -0.1499** -0.1863** -0.1357 -0.1649(0.0711) (0.0809) (0.0861) (0.0004)
EBITDA/Assets (T) -0.2039*** -0.2279*** -0.2703*** -0.2358(0.0491) (0.0547) (0.0585) (0.0004)
Log(Market Cap) (B) -0.0758*** -0.0832*** -0.1005*** -0.0929(0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0146) (0.0001)
Log(Market Cap) (T) 0.0521*** 0.0645*** 0.1050*** 0.0815(0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0222) (0.0003)
Relative Market Cap -0.1758** -0.2558*** -0.3142*** -0.2821(0.0890) (0.0935) (0.1017) (0.0004)
Market Share 0.1861** 0.1454* 0.1126 0.1304(0.0843) (0.0845) (0.0916) (0.0002)
Deregulation Window 0.0106 0.0068 0.0097 0.0075(0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0000)
Abnormal Cash Held (B) 0.0913* -0.0671 -0.0473 -0.0625 (0.0494) (0.0476) (0.0508) (0.0002)
Payout Ratio(B)   0.0081 0.0233* 0.0355** 0.0262  (0.0148) (0.0131) (0.0151) (0.0001)
Debt/assets (B) 0.0499 0.0165 0.0397 0.0198 (0.0417) (0.0388) (0.0423) (0.0002)
Debt/assets (T)   -0.0014 0.0584* 0.0790** 0.0647  (0.0374) (0.0353) (0.0378) (0.0002)
Institutional ownership (B) -0.1522*** -0.0640*** -0.0708***  (0.0241) (0.0237) (0.0242) 
Institutional ownership (T)   -0.0319 0.0069 0.0220   (0.0240) (0.0255) (0.0262) 
Tobin's Q (B) -0.0213*** -0.0043 -0.0155* -0.0086 (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0082) (0.0001)
Runup (B)   -0.0351*** -0.0181 -0.0284** -0.0226  (0.0131) (0.0120) (0.0132) (0.0001)
Volatility (B) 2.0086*** -0.3798 -0.3717 -0.3396 (0.7310) (0.7314) (0.7561) (0.0004)
Tobin's Q (T)   -0.0186*** -0.0099* -0.0147** -0.0107  (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0000)
Runup (T) 0.0046 0.0055 0.0043 0.0055 (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0000)
Volatility (T)   0.5286 -0.2181 -0.6245 -0.3986  (0.5374) (0.5633) (0.6029) (0.0027)
Percent cash 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Number of bidders   0.0373*** 0.0357*** 0.0397*** 0.0375  (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0134) (0.0000)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.1054***  (0.0431) 
N 743 735 770 722 2860
N Uncensored   722 
Pseudo-R2 38.6% 21.3% 22.5% 42.1% 47.6%
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Table 5 – Investors’ Reaction to Merger Announcements and Management Projections of Operating Synergies. Panel A 
reports summary statistics for announcement and announcement-to-completion combined cumulative abnormal stock return 
(CAR) around key merger-related events (i.e., offer announcement and completion) dates. Around Merger Announcement (-t, t) 
[Merger Announcement-to-Completion (-t, t)] is the event window starting t trading days prior to when the target is put in play – 
i.e., receives the first merger or acquisition offer during the calendar year ending on the current offer announcement date, and 
ending t trading days after the current offer announcement [completion] date. 4-Factor (-t, t) is the sum of daily residuals from 
the Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model over the relevant event window. The Carhart (1997) four-factor model is estimated using 
at least 60 and as many as 250 daily returns on the value-weighted portfolio of target and bidder common equity, ending 60 
trading days prior to when the target is put in play. The weights are adjusted for the bidder’s toehold on the offer announcement 
date, following Bates, Lemmon, and Linck (2005). The 4-Factor CAR computation is restricted to deals for which the bidder 
announces no other offer over the estimation and event (-20, 20) windows. We compute ($) dollar abnormal returns as the 
product of the daily abnormal return by the toehold-adjusted combined market capitalization at close of the previous trading day 
and cumulate the daily wealth changes over the relevant event window. t-stat is test-statistic for the hypothesis that the mean of 
the corresponding variable is equal to 0, derived following Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991). The column labeled P-
value t-test (Wilcoxon) reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from the same distribution.  
Panel A: Sample Characteristics of Combined cumulative abnormal returns around merger announcements 
  No  Forecast    Forecast    P-value 
N Mean Median t-stat N Mean Median t-stat t-test Wilcoxon 
Around Merger Announcement Date 
% 4-Factor (-1, 1) 2125 2.0 1.3 14.0   654 2.7 1.6 9.9   0.00 0.00 
% 4-Factor (-20, 20) 2125 1.9 1.8 6.9  654 3.3 2.3 5.7  0.02 0.04 
From Merger Announcement to Effective Date 
% 4-Factor (-20, 20) 1622 -0.9 -0.1 0.4   534 5.2 4.2 4.4   0.00 0.00 
Panel B reports OLS estimates of the relation between merger CAR and the value of synergies projections. In all models, the 
dependent variable is the combined CAR computed over the relevant event window based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model. The variable Synergies is the present value of projected synergies from the Firm Discount Rate Perpetuity Model scaled 
by the combined pre-merger toehold-adjusted market value of equity, as defined in Panel B of Table 3. Predicted (Residual) 
Synergies is the predicted (residual) value of Synergies from the model (5) in Table 4. Control Vars. is the full set of deal 
characteristics included in Table 4. Estimates in columns 1-4 and 6-9 – i.e., Forecast – use deals accompanied by management 
projections only, columns 5 and 10 – i.e., No Forecast – use deals for which management releases no forecasts of merger-related 
gains. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance of the corresponding estimate at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% probability level, respectively. All models include year and industry fixed effects. 
Panel B: Relation between projected operating synergies and CAR around merger announcements 
  Around Merger Announcement (-20, 20)    Announcement-to-Completion (-20, 20) 
Forecast  
No 
Forecast   
No 
Forecast Forecast 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Synergies 0.2531*** 0.1964*** 
           0.4554*** 0.2593**         
(0.0445) (0.0515)            (0.0970) (0.1199)         
Predicted 
Synergies 
0.3982** 0.4832*** 1.0659*** 1.193*** 
    (0.1651)   (0.0961)       (0.3014)   (0.2963) 
Residual 
Synergies 
      0.2240***               0.3081**      
      (0.0651)               (0.1377)      
Control Vars. No  Yes No    No  No  Yes No    No  
N 654 546 546   1740    534 442 442    1304 
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.147 0.078   0.04   0.041 0.238 0.056   0.047 
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Table 6 – Post-merger Operating Performance Changes and Management Projections of Operating Synergies. Panel A of 
this table reports summary statistics for changes in merging firms’ operating performance following completed deals, 
conditional on whether management discloses synergies projections (No Forecast vs. Forecast). Raw changes are computed as: 
ሺܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁	ܺሻିଵ,஺௩௚ሺଵ	௧௢	ଷሻ ൌ 	 ሺܣݒ݃ሺܺி௒ଵ	௧௢	ி௒ଷሻ െ ܺி௒ିଵሻ ∗ 100, 
where ܣݒ݃ሺܺி௒ଵ	௧௢	ி௒ଷሻ is the average of the merged entity’s operating performance measure X over the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd fiscal 
years following completion; ܺி௒ିଵ is the weighted-average of the merging firms’ stand-alone X as of the last fiscal year prior to 
the offer announcement. X is either the Operating Expenses-to-Sales ratio or EBITDA-to-Asset ratio. Operating Expenses is the 
sum of all operating expenses excluding depreciation and amortization; EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation 
and amortization. The industry-year median benchmark is the median performance measure X among firms in the same merging 
firms’ industry – based on Fama-French (1997) 49-industry classification – that do not complete mergers and acquisitions over 
the measurement period. High (Low) ROA Acquirers [Targets] includes deals by acquirers [targets] whose pre-merger industry-
adjusted ROA is in the highest (lowest) tercile of the sample. High (Low) Acquirer [Targets] Industry Growth includes 
completed deals by bidders [targets] whose pre-merger industry sales growth is in the highest (lowest) tercile of the sample. High 
(Low) Acq. [Tgt] Ind. Horizontal Merger Intensity includes completed deals by bidders [targets] whose industry horizontal 
merger intensity is in the highest (lowest) tercile of the sample. Horizontal merger intensity is measured as the value-weighted 
proportion of same Fama-French industry firms completing horizontal deals in the four quarters prior to the deal announcement. 
The sample is restricted to deals for which the merged entity completes no other merger or acquisition during the post-completion 
measurement period. t-stat provides the Student-t for the hypothesis that the mean of the corresponding variable is equal to 0. P-
value t-test (Wilcoxon) reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the corresponding variable for the two samples is drawn 
from the same distribution.  
Panel A: Post-Merger Change in Industry/Year-adjusted Operating Performance (%) 
  No Forecast   Forecast   P-value 
N Mean Median t-stat N Mean Median t-stat 
t-
test Wilcoxon 
Oper. Exp./Sales 1518 -3.51 -0.63 -4.52 478 -1.41 -0.80 -1.78 0.15 0.51 
EBITDA/ Asset 1466 0.59 0.50 3.14   456 0.22 0.20 0.87   0.32 0.22 
High ROA Acquirer 
OperExp/Sales 535 -2.01 0.16 -2.50 130 -0.41 -0.71 -0.30 0.53 0.76 
EBITDA/Total Asset 535 0.22 0.44 0.80 130 -0.58 -0.21 -1.20 0.38 0.15 
Low ROA Acquirer 
OperExp/Sales 450 -9.51 -1.61 -3.20 162 -3.83 -1.56 -2.30 0.60 0.59 
EBITDA/Total Asset 443 1.73 1.22 3.90 162 1.48 0.94 3.00 0.97 0.80 
High Acquirer Industry Growth 
OperExp/Sales 479 -2.80 -1.29 -3.50 146 -1.51 -1.84 -1.50 0.59 0.76 
EBITDA/Total Asset 453 1.18 0.89 3.80 135 1.02 0.50 2.00 0.81 0.49 
Low Acquirer Industry Growth 
OperExp/Sales 465 -3.29 0.32 -2.30 168 -0.36 -0.02 -0.40 0.54 0.73 
EBITDA/Total Asset 451 -0.29 -0.05 -0.80 161 -0.49 -0.09 -1.30 0.89 0.59 
High Acquirer Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity 
OperExp/Sales 396 -1.13 -1.29 -0.70 129 -1.00 -1.56 -1.00 0.76 0.73 
EBITDA/Total Asset 393 1.07 0.81 3.30 129 0.61 0.47 1.50 0.91 0.54 
Low Acquirer Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity 
OperExp/Sales 568 -5.85 -0.52 -4.00 151 -0.15 -0.08 -0.10 0.87 0.13 
EBITDA/Total Asset 521 0.20 0.19 0.60    136 0.01 0.15 0.00    0.88 0.53 
 
Continued…   
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Continued… 
High ROA Target 
OperExp/Sales 469 -0.75 0.16 -0.90 149 0.74 0.49 0.70 0.67 0.27 
EBITDA/Total Asset 467 -0.09 -0.05 -0.30 149 -1.00 -0.40 -2.30 0.28 0.16 
Low ROA Target 
OperExp/Sales 524 -11.55 -2.14 -4.10 125 -5.28 -2.09 -2.80 0.91 0.76 
EBITDA/Total Asset 515 1.59 1.33 4.10 122 1.74 1.78 3.50 0.90 0.86 
High Target Industry Growth 
OperExp/Sales 464 -2.73 -1.16 -3.10 142 -0.97 -1.84 -1.10 0.56 0.81 
EBITDA/Total Asset 438 0.87 0.82 2.60 131 0.79 0.46 1.50 0.86 0.56 
Low Target Industry Growth 
OperExp/Sales 476 -1.28 0.32 -1.20 168 -1.31 -0.96 -1.70 0.67 0.12 
EBITDA/Total Asset 456 -0.15 -0.08 -0.40 161 -0.16 -0.09 -0.40 0.99 0.92 
High Target Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity 
OperExp/Sales 416 -2.29 -1.00 -2.10 131 -1.02 -1.84 -1.00 0.55 0.89 
EBITDA/Total Asset 411 0.81 0.64 2.70 131 0.62 0.44 1.60 0.68 0.92 
Low Target Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity 
OperExp/Sales 555 -2.84 -0.53 -1.70 157 -0.73 -0.08 -0.80 0.74 0.33 
EBITDA/Total Asset 515 0.05 0.18 0.10   142 0.07 0.12 0.10    0.90 0.70 
 
Panel B reports estimates of the relation between changes in merging firms’ operating performance and management projections 
of synergies. In columns 1-2 and 5-6, the dependent variable is the change in the merged entity’s ratio of EBITDA to assets. In 
columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the change in the merged entity’s ratio of operating expenses to sales. Synergies is the 
average before-tax projected synergies over the first three years following completion scaled by the merged entity’s assets or 
sales in the relevant year. Predicted (Residual) Synergies is the predicted (residual) Synergies when the Two-step Heckman model 
in Table 4 is estimated using the current definition of Synergies. Control Vars. is the full set of deal characteristics included in 
model 4 of Table 4. Models in columns 1-5, Forecast, are estimated using deals accompanied by management projections of 
synergies; the one in column 6, No Forecast, is estimated using deals for which no management forecast of synergies is available. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance of the estimate 10%, 5%, and 1% probability level, 
respectively. All models include year and industry fixed effects. 
Panel B: Relation between projected operating synergies and CAR around merger announcements 
  Forecast   
No 
Forecast 
EBITDA/Assets Oper. Exp./Sales EBITDA/Assets 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Synergies 
0.4864** 0.1589    -0.958*** -0.3974            
(0.2427) (0.3769)   (0.3592)     (0.3289)         
Predicted 1.4623** 0.7335* 
Synergies             (0.5832)   (0.4191) 
Residual                   0.2331     
Synergies             (0.3563)     
Control 
No Yes   No Yes     No    No Vars. 
N 456 404    478 401    404   1173 
Adjusted R2 5.80% 11.80%    8.50% 18.50%    6.10%   3.80% 
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Table 7 – Post-Merger Stock Returns conditional on Availability Management Projections of Operating Synergies. This 
table reports monthly alphas of portfolios of completed mergers formed conditional of whether management discloses synergies 
forecasts. Starting in January 1992 and ending on December 2008, equally-weighted end-of-month portfolio returns are 
calculated each month using completed mergers in the relevant sample and period. The relevant period is 1 to 36, 7 to 42, or 13 to 
48 months prior to the current calendar month. Monthly portfolio excess returns, Rp,t-Rf,t, are then regressed on Carhart (1997) 
four factors: 
   Rp,t-Rf,t= αp+ βp*MKTt + γp*SMBt + δp*HMLt + θp*UMDt + εp,t , 
where Rf,t is the return of the one-month T-bills, MKTt is the excess return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, SMBt is the 
difference in returns between portfolios of small and large stocks, HMLt is the difference in returns between portfolios of high 
and low book-to-market ratio stocks, UMDt is the difference in returns between portfolios of high and low prior 12-month return 
stocks. The model is estimated by weighted least squares (WLS) regressions, with weights equal to the square root of the number 
of firms in the calendar-month portfolio. The P-value of the intercept for the hypothesis of zero abnormal returns is based on 
robust standard errors. Forecast (No Forecast) refers to portfolios of completed deals for which management discloses (no) 
forecasts of synergies. Long/Short Portfolio refers to portfolios long in completed Forecast deals and short in No Forecast deals.  
All Completed Mergers7 includes all completed deals. All Completed Mergers Financed with Any Equity includes completed 
deals financed at least in part with bidder equity. All Completed Mergers Financed with with All Equity includes completed deals 
100% financed with bidder equity. All completed deals financed by High BM Acquirers includes completed deals by bidders 
whose pre-merger book-to-market ratio is in the highest tercile of the sample. All completed deals by Low BM Acquirers includes 
completed deals by bidders whose pre-merger book-to-market ratio is in the lowest tercile of the sample. High (Low) ROA 
Acquirers [Targets] includes completed deals by bidders [targets] whose pre-merger industry-adjusted ROA is in the highest 
(lowest) tercile of the sample. High (Low) Acquirer [Target] Industry Growth includes completed deals by bidders [targets] 
whose pre-merger industry sales growth is in the highest (lowest) tercile of the sample. Mergers High (Low) Acquirer [Target] 
Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity includes completed deals by bidders [targets] whose industry horizontal merger intensity is 
in the highest (lowest) tercile of the sample. Horizontal merger intensity is measured as the value-weighted proportion of same 
Fama-French industry firms completing horizontal deals in the four quarters prior to the deal announcement. 
 
Continued… 
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Continued… 
Equal-weighted Calendar Time Carhart’s (1999) Four-Factor Alphas for Portfolios of Mergers Completed 
1 to 36  
months prior 
7 to 42 
 months prior 
13 to 48 
 months prior 
Alpha (%) Alpha (%) Alpha (%) 
P-Value P-Value P-Value 
All Completed Mergers 
Long No Forecast 0.132 0.178 0.275** 0.22 0.11 0.02 
Long Forecast -0.274** -0.301** -0.314** 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Long Forecast/Short No Forecast -0.353** -0.471*** -0.590*** 0.01   0.00   0.00 
Mergers Financed with Any Equity 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.371** -0.470*** -0.658*** 0.03 0.01 0.00 
Mergers Financed with All Equity 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.32 -0.460** -0.681*** 0.12   0.03   0.00 
Mergers by High BM Acquirers 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.958*** -0.980*** -1.326*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mergers by Low BM Acquirers 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.09 -0.348* -0.382** 0.52   0.08   0.03 
Mergers by High ROA Acquirers 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.622** -0.647** -0.824*** 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Mergers by Low ROA Acquirers 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.374* -0.526** -0.757*** 0.10   0.03   0.00 
Mergers by High Acquirer Industry Growth 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.577*** -0.594*** -0.734*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Mergers by Low Acquirer Industry Growth 
Long/Short Portfolio 0.16 -0.03 -0.15 0.40   0.89   0.46 
Mergers by High Acquirer Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.617*** -0.591** -0.754*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Mergers by Low Acquirer Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.16 -0.41 -0.652* 0.59   0.23   0.08 
Mergers by High ROA Targets 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.31 -0.472* -0.781*** 0.20 0.05 0.00 
Mergers by Low ROA Targets 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.656** -0.881*** -1.178*** 0.02   0.00   0.00 
Mergers by High Target Industry Growth 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.526** -0.525** -0.723*** 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Mergers by Low Target Industry Growth 
Long/Short Portfolio 0.02 -0.19 -0.307* 0.90   0.32   0.10 
Mergers by High Target Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.563*** -0.526** -0.615*** 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Mergers by Low Target Industry Horizontal Merger Intensity 
Long/Short Portfolio -0.25 -0.704* -0.90** 0.52   0.10   0.05 
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Table 8 – Post-Merger Stock Returns conditional on Investors’ Ex-Ante Assessment of and Firms’ Ex-Post Ability to 
Deliver Operating Synergies Projected by Management. The table reports linear regression estimates for the relation between 
post-completion annualized Jensen-alphas and the pre-completion capitalization and post-completion realization of management 
projections of synergies. In columns 1 and 2 –  Raw, the dependent variable is the post-completion firm-level annualized alpha 
from the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model, where the firm-level alpha is estimated separately for the each of three calendar years 
following completion – at least 200 and as many as 252 trading days – starting 20 trading days after the deal’s completion. 
Control Vars. are all the variables in Table 4 and described in Appendix C. Syn. Delivery and Capitalization are defined as: 
ܦ݈݁݅ݒ݁ݎݕ ൌ ቂ1 ൅ ቀ∑ ቀா஻ூ்஽஺஺௦௦௘௧௦ ቁ௧	 3⁄
ଷ௧ୀଵ ቁ 	െ	ቀா஻ூ்஽஺஺௦௦௘௧௦ ቁିଵቃ ቂ1 ൅ ∑ ቀ
்௢௧	ௌ௬௡
஺௦௦௘௧௦ ቁ௧	
ଷ௧ୀଵ 3⁄ ቃൗ , 
ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ൣ1 ൅ ܥܣܴ஺௡௡ି஼௢௠௣௟൧ ቂ1 ൅ ௉௏ሺ஺௙௧௘௥ି்௔௫	்௢௧	ௌ௬௡ሻ௉௥௘ି஺௡௡	ெ௔௥௞௘௧	஼௔௣ ቃൗ . 
In columns3-6 – Log-transformed, the dependent variable, the annualized alpha, as well as the independent variables (Syn. 
Delivery Ratio)1,3 and (Syn. Capitalization Ratio)Ann-Eff  are log-transformed. Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are clustered 
by firm and calendar year following Petersen (2007). *, **, *** indicate significance of the corresponding estimate at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% probability level, respectively. F-stat(Hp: Deliv=-Capit) and F-stat P-value provide the Wald test F-statistic and 
associated p-value for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on (Syn. Delivery Ratio)1,3 equals the additive inverse of the 
coefficient on (Syn. Capitalization Ratio)Ann-Eff. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The analysis is restricted to 
deals for which the merged entity completes no other merger and acquisition during the three calendar years following 
completion of the current deal and synergies forecasts are publicly available. 
Panel A – Ordinary least-square regressions 
  Raw   Log-transformed 
(1) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(2) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(3) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(4) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(5) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
(6) 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Ratio   0.0004**   0.0004*** 
  0.0511*** 0.0653***     
(0.0002) (0.0001)   (0.0131) (0.0103)     
(Syn. Delivery)1,3 
0.0526*** 0.0668*** 
    (0.0133) (0.0107) 
(Syn. Capitalization)Ann-Eff 
          -0.0472*** -0.0604*** 
          (0.0153) (0.0139) 
Control Vars. No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
N 1,208  1,133    1,208  1,133  1,208  1,133  
Adjusted R2 1.5% 2.9% 3.2% 4.1% 3.2% 4.0% 
F-stat(Hp: Deliv=-Capit)            0.28 0.29 
F-stat P-value            0.59 0.59 
Panel B – Median regressions    
Ratio 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
  0.0391*** 0.0579***     
(0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0107) (0.0117)     
(Syn. Delivery)1,3 
0.0427*** 0.0586*** 
    (0.0074) (0.0120) 
(Syn. Capitalization)Ann-Eff 
          -0.0318*** -0.0489*** 
          (0.0091) (0.0156) 
Control Vars. No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
N 1,208  1,133    1,208  1,133  1,208  1,133  
Pseudo-R2 3.3% 4.7% 3.6% 5.1% 3.7% 5.2% 
F-stat(Hp: Deliv=-Capit)            2.3 0.63 
F-stat P-value            0.13 0.43 
 
  
45 
 
Table 9 – Availability of Synergies Projections and Merger Performance, controlling for Self-Selection. This table reports 
full-information maximum-likelihood estimates of the relation between merger performance and the availability of synergies 
projections (No Forecast vs. Forecast), when jointly modeled with the management decision to release public forecasts. The 
equation for the decision to release public projections of synergies includes all the explanatory variables described in model 5 of 
Table 4. The table reports: the total number of observations used to estimate the treatment-effect model, N; the correlation 
between the residuals of the treatment and selection equations, Rho; and the mean performance conditional on the availability of 
synergies forecast, as well as the difference between the Forecast and No Forecast sample. χ2 P-Val provides the chi-squared p-
value for the null hypothesis that the corresponding statistic is equal to zero. 
 
      No Forecast   Forecast   Treatment Effect     
N Mean 
χ2
P-Val Mean 
χ2
P-Val Mean 
χ2
P-Val Rho 
χ2
P-Val 
Announcement CAR (*100) 
% 4-Factor (-20, 20) 2,265  1.36 0.01 5.51 0.00 4.15 0.00  -0.12 0.03 
Announcement-to-Completion CAR (*100) 
% 4-Factor (-20, 20) 1,754  -3.10 0.02 10.93 0.00 14.04 0.00  -0.18 0.01 
Change in Industry/Year-adjusted Operating Measures (*100) 
EBITDA/Total Asset 1585  0.78 0.00 -0.69 0.13 -1.48 0.01  0.12 0.07 
OperExp/Sales 1556   -2.38 0.00   0.58 0.63   2.96 0.05  -0.07 0.30  
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Table 10 – Relation between Projected Synergies and Merger Performance, controlling for Self-Selection. This table 
reports full-information maximum-likelihood estimates of the relation between merger performance and management projections 
of merger-related gains, when jointly modeled with the decision to disclose (or not disclose) public forecasts of synergies. The 
equation for the decision to release public projections of synergies includes all the explanatory variables described in model 5 of 
Table 4. In addition to coefficient estimates and robust standard errors for the performance-forecasts relation, each table reports: 
the number of observations used to estimate the selection model, N; the number of uncensored observations used to estimate the 
performance-forecasts relation, Uncensored; the estimated correlation between the residuals of the two equations in the model, 
Rho, and its standard error, Std. Err.(Rho). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% probability level, 
respectively. Refer to earlier tables for variables’ definitions and sample restrictions. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. 
Panel A: Relation with Announcement Returns, controlling for self-selection 
  Ann. CAR (-20, 20) Ann.-Compl. CAR (-20, 20) 
Forecast
No 
Forecast Forecast 
No 
Forecast
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. Coeff.  Coeff. 
 (SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
Synergies  0.2474***          0.4487***       (0.0420)         (0.0871)       
Predicted Synergies    0.3794***  0.4416***    1.0012***  1.0086***  (0.1187)  (0.0736)   (0.2663)  (0.1947) 
Residual Synergies    0.2150***          0.3231***       (0.0501)         (0.1041)     
N 2,286 2,286 2,286 1,746 1,746 1,746 
N Uncensored 546 546   1,740   442 442   1,304 
Pseudo R2 4.3% 4.6% 4.2% 3.7% 3.8% 4.1% 
Rho -0.079 -0.0429   -0.0699   -0.2194* -0.1059   0.3797* 
Std. Err.(Rho) (0.0922) (0.0974)   (0.2151)   (0.1225) (0.1299)   (0.1471) 
 
Panel B: Relation with Post-Merger Changes in Ind. Adj. Op. Performance, controlling for self-selection 
Forecast 
No 
Forecast 
EBITDA Oper. Exp.  EBITDA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Synergies 
0.4338*** -0.921***     
(0.1802) (0.2478) 
Predicted     2.0143*** 0.8171** 
Synergies   (0.6134)   (0.3269) 
Residual     0.2059   
Synergies       (0.1978)     
N 1577 1539 1577 1577 
N Uncensored 404 401 404 1173 
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.055 0.042 0.057 
Rho -0.0582 0.0301 -0.0099 -0.396** 
SE(Rho) (0.1073) (0.1205)   (0.1066)   (0.1453) 
 
